Drafting the Inhuman: Conjectures on Capitalism and Organic Necrocracy

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‘And beyond all this we have yet to disturb the peace of this world in still another way.’¹

Quod exitus sectabor iter?

With the burgeoning popularity of speculative thought, it is becoming more evident that what is labelled as ‘speculative’ is more an epiphenomenon of the inquisitive re-negotiation of human faculties, their limits and vulnerabilities rather, than a counter-intuitive foray into the abyssal vistas unlocked by contemporary science. Accordingly, in the more extreme forms of speculative thought, political intervention and political analysis have been curtailed or at least have been temporarily suspended. This is because the horizon of agency (of emancipation or intervention), ontological privileges and conditions of experience are precisely those ingredients of political thought which are under the process of critical interrogation. Yet strangely, it seems that speculative thought has not given up remarking on capitalism—this hypothetical mathesis universalis of politico-economic problems—even in some of its most apolitical moments.²

For the purpose of understanding some of the disjunctive impasses between speculative thought and politics as well as possibilities for mobilizing a politics capable of using the resources of speculative thought, this essay will concentrate its energy on the most recurring politico-economic figure of speculative thought: Capitalism. To do so, we shall, in proceeding steps, dissect the uncanny affinities between contemporary capitalism’s insinuations of an inhuman politics and speculative thought’s assault on the human’s ‘empirically overdetermined set of cognitive faculties impose[d] upon the speculative imagination’.³ We shall subsequently investigate the lines of correspond-

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². Capitalism is a hypothetical universal platform of problem-solving and information processing which for every problem and desire determines a solution—a market—by recourse to an immanent death which exteriorizes it as a liquidating form of animation (production?) which intensifies and becomes more intricate as it encompasses more problems (potential resources).

ence between the inhumanist conception of capitalism and speculative thought's more extreme attempts for precluding all anthropomorphic predications so as to understand the limits of a politics nurtured by the outcomes of speculative thought. It is only by re-orienting the vectors of speculative thought in relation to these limits that various possibilities or obstacles of a politics capable of mirroring and mobilizing the vectors of speculative thought come to light.

I

Whereas numerous texts have been written on Freud's energetic model of the nervous system presented in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, few of them have continued developing Freud's energetic analysis in the same speculative spirit. Yet even among the handful of these works, nearly all the emphasis has been put on the most explicitly expressed lines of Beyond the Pleasure Principle in regard to the inevitability of regression toward inorganic exteriority qua death. What can be called thanatropic regression or the compulsion of the organic to return to the inorganic state of dissolution has been frequently accentuated at the cost of sacrificing the more speculative fronts of Freud's energetic model in regard to trauma and the economic order of the organism. Following Deleuze and Guattari's lead regarding the intimate relationship between Freud's account of the death-drive and capitalism, Freud's theory of thanatropic regression has become a recurrent speculative tool in building a double-faced and hence elusive image of capitalism which despite its adherence to the conservative interests of humans registers itself as a planetary singularity which is at once inevitable and disenchantingly emancipating.

Freud himself indeed spoke of the link between his ‘discovery’ of the death instinct and World War I, which remains the model of capitalist war. More generally, the death instinct celebrates the wedding of psychoanalysis and capitalism; their engagement had been full of hesitation. What we have tried to show apropos of capitalism is how it inherited much from a transcendent death-carrying agency, the despotic signifier, but also how it brought about this agency's effusion in the full immanence of its own system: the full body, having become that of capital-money, suppresses the distinction between production and antiproduction: everywhere it mixes antiproduction with the productive forces in the immanent reproduction of its own always widened limits (the axiomatic). The death enterprise is one of the principal and specific forms of the absorption of surplus value in capitalism. It is this itinerary that psychoanalysis rediscovers and retraces with the death instinct [...]

According to this double-faced image of capitalism predicated upon the politico-economic insinuations of the death-drive, in gaining its own angular momentum capitalism brings forth an emancipation in terms other than those of the human. In this case, whilst capitalism is open to human interests, it also moves toward a planetary emancipation wherein the capitalist singularity departs from human purposiveness and privileges. This image of capitalism as something that can simultaneously be in the service of human interests and be an inhuman model of emancipation has become a common romantic trope among philosophers who advocate capitalism as that which is capable of wedding the concrete economy of human life to a cosmos where neither being nor thinking enjoy any privilege.

As Nick Land has elaborated in The Thirst for Annihilation as well as his essays, what brings about the possibility of this weird marriage between human praxis and

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inhuman emancipation is the tortuous economy of dissipation inherent to capitalism as its partially repressed desire for meltdown.\(^5\) Although the economy of dissipation can be captured by humans through a libidinal materialist participation with the techno-capitalist singularity, it ultimately escapes the gravity of humans and entails their dissolution into the inorganic exteriority. Capitalism in this sense is not an attainable state but rather a dissipative (anti-essence) tendency or process which moves along the detours of organizational complexity, increasing commodification and convoluted syntheses of techné and physis so as to ultimately deliver human's conservative horizon into an unbound state of dissolution. Immunological impulses of capitalism against its implicit desire for meltdown are doomed to fail as capitalism fully gains it angular momentum by reaping planetary resources and conceiving its irremediably schizophrenic image.

Machinic desire can seem a little inhuman, as it rips up political cultures, deletes traditions, dissolves subjectivities, and hacks through security apparatuses, tracking a soulless tropism to zero control. This is because what appears to humanity as the history of capitalism is an invasion from the future by an artificial intelligent space that must assemble itself entirely from its enemy's resources.\(^6\)

It is this singularized deliverance of the human to the state of dissolution—concomitant with its pulverizing impact on the correlation between thought and the self-love of man (\textit{viz.} organic survivalism)—that assigns capitalism an inhuman emancipative role. This model of emancipation is comparable with H.P. Lovecraft's fantastic concept 'holocaust of freedom' which celebrates the consummation of human doom with human emancipation. Thus through a politico-economic reappropriation of Freud's theory of the death-drive, Nick Land identifies capital as a planetary singularity toward utter dissipation whose dynamism becomes more complicated as it circuitously verges upon zero.

Once the commodity system is established there is no longer a need for an autonomous cultural impetus into the order of the abstract object. Capital attains its own 'angular momentum', perpetuating a run-away whirlwind of dissolution, whose hub is the virtual zero of impersonal metropolitan accumulation. At the peak of its productive prowess the human animal is hurled into a new nakedness, as everything stable is progressively liquidated in the storm.\(^7\)

Now compare Land's trenchant veneration of Freud's account of the death-drive as a creativity that pushes life into its extravagances with the inhumanist model of capitalism wherein the affirmation of and demand for more is but 'a river's search for the sea'.

The death drive is not a desire for death, but rather a hydraulic tendency to the dissipation of intensities. In its primary dynamics it is utterly alien to everything human, not least the three great pettinesses of representation, egoism, and hatred. The death drive is Freud's beautiful account of how creativity occurs without the least effort, how life is propelled into its extravagances by the blindest and simplest of tendencies, how desire is no more problematic than a river's search for the sea.\(^8\)

\(^{5}\) Despite all approaching critical evidences, few of the conjectural lines in this essay could have been developed without Nick Land's original contributions which have irreproachably left their distinctive marks on the larval body of speculative thought.


\(^{8}\) Nick Land, ‘Making It with Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring Production’, \textit{British Journal of Phenomenology}, vol. 24, no. 1, 1993, pp. 74-75.
Land here presents a model or definition of capitalism which despite its collusive entanglements with human’s desires and interests is a detoured and hence complex singularity toward the inorganic exteriority which ultimately enforces an all-inclusive liberation from the conservative nature of the organism and its confines for thought. Yet the question we must ask is whether the capitalist dissipative singularity is really emancipative or not? And even more crucially, does the capitalist model of accelerating planetary dissipation really effectuate an inhumanist model of emancipation that breaks away from the conservative ambits of the human? The ambition of this essay is, accordingly, to renegotiate the definition of the capitalist singularity through a closer and more extreme engagement with Freud’s speculative thesis on thanatropic regression. Accordingly, we shall investigate if this emancipative conception of capitalism genuinely presents a radical model of the Inhuman or not.

The collusion between science and capitalism imparts an alarmingly critical significance to such inspections into the relation between capitalism and its image as an inevitable singularity that coheres with the compulsive regression of the organism toward the inorganic exteriority. The collusion of capitalism with science enables capitalism to incorporate contemporary science’s continuous disenchantment of cosmos as the locus of absolute objectivity and inevitable extinction. In doing so, capitalism can establish a concurrently inevitable and emancipative image of itself: Capitalism is inevitable because it terrestrially coincides with and converges upon the cosmic ‘truth of extinction’ (Brassier); it is emancipative because it harbours the debacle of human and binds the enlightening disenchantment implicit in dissolution as an objectifying truth. In other words, the complicity of science and capitalism provides capitalism with a speculative weapon capable of imposing capitalism as the universal horizon of politico-economic problems as well as the ultimate mode of departure from the restricting ambit of the terrestrial sphere. Whilst the former grants capitalism a vector of participation, the latter constitutes capitalism’s crafty model of emancipation.

In a sense, probably nothing has been more profitable for capitalism than its clandestine alliance with science through whose support capitalism has become increasingly elusive, more difficult to resist, harder to escape and more seductive for those who await the imminent homecoming of scientific enlightenment or the advent of technological singularities. Antihumanism, in this regard, has ironically become the formidable assassin of capitalism in that it connects capitalism with an inhumanist model of emancipation or grants capitalism mythical powers against various manifestations of humanist hubris. Therefore, this essay can also be read as a speculative repriyal against the supposedly antihumanist aspects of capitalism which contribute to its image as an irresistible singularity. This essay, consequently, shall attempt to wrest a radical conception of inhumanism from the Capital-nurturing hands of antihumanism in its various forms. In the wake of the complicity between science and capitalism, it is becoming more evident that the inhumanist resistance against capitalism should not dabble in preaching against humanism and its philosophical minions. Instead, it should dispose of the kind of antihumanist thought that romantically—whether willingly or not—contributes to the cult of Capital and occludes both thinking and praxis. One can recapitulate the above suspicions in regard to an antihumanist definition of capitalism in two questions:

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1. To what extent does the Freudian appropriation of Capital—tipped by Deleuze and Guattari and fully fashioned by Nick Land through the politico-economic unbinding of Freud's theory of thanatropic regression—as an antihumanist yet emancipative conception shatter the illusive sovereignty of the human and ally itself with the inhumanism that it claims to be the harbinger of?

2. Does the cosmological reinscription of Freud's account of the death-drive that extends the thanatropic regression from the organism to all other forms of embodiment (from organic life to the plant to stellar formations down to matter itself) repudiate the image of capitalism as an inexorable yet emancipative twister toward utter liquidation? Can the reinscription of Freud's theory of thanatropic regression on a cosmic level redeem antihumanism and rescue it from the clutches of capitalism? For it seems that in his recent work _Nihil Unbound_, Ray Brassier, following Land's novel approach to Freud in _The Thirst for Annihilation_, has resorted to the latter solution in order to wipe the stains of capitalism from the face of a cosmically eliminativist model of enlightenment (i.e. scientific nihilism as the daredevil of speculative thought)?

II

The identification of capitalism as a singularity at once participatory (hence open to praxis) and emancipative should not be oversimplified as an impotently phantasmic conception which passively awaits its actualization. It is rather a potent support and guarantor for the creative praxis of capitalism on all levels. It is the seamless integration of singularized inevitability and emancipative ubiquity that calls for a spontaneous praxis. And it is the emphasis on praxis that speeds the awakening of Capital's sweeping whirlwind. Therefore, such an identification of capitalism has become a programmatic form of apologetics for capitalism's ubiquity which in turn justifies the axiomatic assimilation of all planetary systems, forms of life and vectors of thought by the mimetic flow of Capital. The ubiquity of capitalism, to this extent, is affirmed precisely by its identification as a liquidating storm which is in the process of dethroning the human from its terrestrial ivory tower. And it is this undulating deluge toward dissipation of matter and energy that either deceitfully mimics or genuinely coincides with the cosmic extinction or the asymptotic disintegration of the universe on an elementary material level, that is to say, the ubiquitous and all-inclusive cosmic truth of extinction, the truth of extinction as such. For this reason, the supposedly inhumanist identification of capitalism serves as a programmatic—rather than merely theoretic—contribution to the pragmatic ethos and assimilating nature of capitalism. This programmatic contribution is conducted by means of drawing a line of correspondence and coincidence between the dissolving forces of capital on the one hand and the disintegrating cosmic forces vigorously heralded by contemporary science on the other. This is why the antihumanist definition of capitalism—especially as a singularity that miraculously weaves participation, cosmic disenchantment and emancipation together—has turned into an allure for various affinities of speculative philosophy and imaginative politics. Whilst the former has been disillusioned in regard to the restrictions of matter as well as subjective or inter-subjective conditions for experience, the latter has grown weary of the romantic bigotries of kitsch Marxism and ruinous follies of liberalism.
In *The Thirst for Annihilation* and later in his numerous essays, Land introduces an inhumanist model of capitalism through a reappropriation of Freud's energetic model of the nervous system. The reason for Land's emphatic recourse to Freud's energetic model is that the extremity and terrestrial generality of Freud's account of the death-drive are able to universally mobilize capitalism beyond its historic and particular conditions. In other words, it is the death-drive that transcendentally and from within universalizes capital as the all-encompassing capitalism. Furthermore, as Land points out, if death is already inherent to capital as a ‘machine part’, the ‘death of capitalism’ is a delusion either generated by anthropomorphic wishful thinking or neurotic indulgence in victimhood.\(^\text{10}\) In short, Land assumes that the emancipative conception of capitalism requires a realist model capable of positing the reality of emancipation exterior to ontological and subjective privileges of human. And it is Freud's energetic model that as a prototypical model of speculative thought revokes the enchanted ontological privileges of life by presenting life as a temporal scission from its precursor exteriority *qua* inorganic. Both the life of thought and the life of the human body are externally objectified by the originary exteriority that pulls them back toward a dissolution which is posited in anterior posteriority to life. The external objectification of the human hardware—coincidental with the independent reality of dissolution—undermines the monopoly and hegemony of the human genetic lineage as the vehicle of social dynamics. On the other hand, the objectification of thought is traumatically bound as a vector of disillusionment in regard to radical deficiencies of life as the constitutive horizon of thought's topology and dynamism. Such disillusionment paves the road toward an abyssal realm where thought must be armed with a speculative drive. Accordingly for Land, Freud's energetic model is comprised of an emancipative yet implicitly antihumanist front in that it posits the anterior posteriority of dissolution as a radical truth determined to flush human faculties down the latrine of pure objectivity.

However, Freud's energetic model is constituted of another front which does not thoroughly exclude the human: The traumatic scission from the inorganic or any precursor exteriority brings about the possibility of life which consists of energetic opportunities. These energetic opportunities are conservatively enveloped and developed to support the survival (from basic perseverance to complexification) of the organism or the index of interiority. Correspondingly, the energetic opportunities occasioned by the traumatic scission from the precursor exteriority are posed as tortuous driveways toward the originary state of dissolution. The conservative nature of the organism or the emerged interiority utilizes these energetic opportunities—ensued by an originary differentiation from the precursor exteriority—for intensive and extensive activities of sustenance. For this reason, the complication and explication of these energetic opportunities which are in accordance with the conservative nature of the organism can be taken as lines of participation. These opportunities can be programmed to change the topology, economy and dynamism of the inevitable return to the precursor exteriority. In short, the traumatic scission of the organic from the inorganic provides the organism with energetic opportunities which are posited as sites and conditions for participation. The second front of Freud's energetic model of thanatropic regression, accordingly, brings about the possibility of participation without ceasing to be ultimately emancipative and crushingly disenchanting. These two fronts are respectively (a) the emancipative front where dissolution and the disenchanting truth conjoin, and (b) the

\(^{10}\) Land, *Making It with Death*, p. 68.
participative front where the energetic opportunities of the conservative organism can be utilized as accelerative and programmatic vectors in the direction of the aforementioned emancipation.

These two fronts of Freud's model are connected by a maze of material and energy dissipation, an intricately circuitous curve whose slant can become steeper and thereby be accelerated toward the ultimate emancipation. It is here that capitalism is identified with this curve or maze of dissipation that links the conservative nature of the system to an emancipation which knows nothing of the human. The intertwining of a predisposition for accumulation and a passion for liquidation within capitalism resonates with Freud's energetic model in which the conservative nature of the organism is a dissipative twist toward the inorganic exteriority. Capitalism, in this sense, is a dissipative tendency that unfolds through the complicated paths of the conservative horizon, turning the conditions for complexification of life (i.e. resources, techniques, participations, etc.) into conditions for its acceleration and perpetuating its angular momentum. Capitalism's parasitic insistence on its survival is the expression of its constitutive dissipative tendency (desire for meltdown) that must effectuate its singularity by all means and at all costs—hence the machinic conception of capitalism as an open system that assimilates every antagonism or exception as its axioms and resources. This is why in order to present an antihumanist model of capitalism, Land uses the direct correspondence between the conservative-dissipative conception of capitalism and Freud's energetic model of thanatropic regression for the organic conservation. The topologic, economic and dynamic calculi of this definition or model of capitalism as a 'liquidating storm against everything solid' can be found in Freud's theory of thanatropic regression. According to this definition of capitalism, although capitalism is ultimately emancipative in terms other than those of human, it can be participated and accelerated by human and for this reason, it does not exclude an ethics or politics of praxis.

In his tour de force on nihilism and enlightenment, *Nihil Unbound*, Ray Brassier seems to be fully aware of the threats that the Landian definition of capitalism poses against the disenchanting potentials of Freud's account of the death-drive. In the wake of such a definition, the emancipative energy of the truth of extinction implicated in the theory of thanatropic regression is converted to an alien and thus impartial justification for capitalist indulgences which conflate anthropic interests with the ever more complicating paths of organic survivalism. In other words, the inevitable truth of extinction as the apotheosis of the enlightenment's project of disenchantment is exploited by the Freudian reformulation of capitalism. In this way, the 'anterior posteriority' of extinction as an ultimate disenchantment affirms and reenacts human not only as the participating and accelerating element but also as something which deviously reconciles vitalism with the disenchanting 'truth of extinction'. In order to purge Freud's theory of thanatropic regression from such manipulations and draw an 'intimate link between the will to know and the will to nothingness', Ray Brassier presents a genuinely speculative solution. Brassier proposes that Freud's theory of thanatropic regression must be reinscribed on a cosmic level so that not only the organic dissolves into the inorganic but also the inorganic gains a dissipative or loosening tendency to-

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ward the precursor exteriority *qua* the anterior posteriority of extinction. The ‘cosmological re-inscription of Freud’s account of the death-drive’ unshackles the disenchanting and hence emancipative truth of extinction from the capitalism-friendly horizon of vitalism. Just as the organic interiority is deserted on behalf of the inorganic, the inorganic materials as conditions of embodiment are deserted on behalf of an unbound cosmic exteriority where even the elementary fabric of matter is an index of interiorization and must be undone. It is in loosening every index of interiority and deserting their domain of influence that the truth of extinction forces thought to be a speculative imagination for and of the cosmic abyss.

Since cosmic extinction is just as much of an irrecusable factum for philosophy as biological death—although curiously, philosophers seem to assume that the latter is somehow more relevant than the former, as though familiarity were a criterion of philosophical relevance—every horizontal reserve upon which embodied thought draws to fuel its quest will be necessarily finite. Why then should thought continue investing in an account whose dwindling reserves are circumscribed by the temporary parameters of embodiment? Why keep playing for time? A change of body is just a way of postponing thought’s inevitable encounter with the death that drives it in the form of the will to know. And a change of horizon is just a means of occluding the transcendental scope of extinction, precisely insofar as it levels the difference between life and death, time and space, revoking the ontological potency attributed to temporalizing thought in its alleged invulnerability to physical death.

Brassier’s cosmic reinscription of Freud’s thanatropic regression is an attempt to enact eliminativism as an ultimate vector of enlightenment and emancipative disenchantment. Yet to cosmically enact eliminativism, one must have a model to divest all horizons of interiority (from organisms to stars to galaxies and even matter itself) of their ontological potencies and so-called vitalistic opportunities for carrying on the life of thought. The model capable of guaranteeing such a great purge is Freud’s account of the death-drive. However, as Brassier knows, there are two obstacles for the appropriation of Freud’s model: First, as we argued earlier, the allegedly inhumanist conception of capitalism and especially Nick Land’s Freudian reformulation of Capital justifies capitalist indulgences of anthropic agencies as ethical and political vectors. Therefore, the inhumanist conception of capitalism strategically venerates vitalism and its affirmationist policies on behalf of Freud’s theory of the death-drive. The second obstacle is that Freud’s account of the death-drive merely includes a disintegrating transition from the organic to the inorganic, which is to say, the thanatropic regression is peculiar to organic life in general. For this reason, Brassier tweaks Freud’s account of the death-drive by reinscribing and reenacting it on a cosmic level. This way the vector of eliminativism can abandon the horizon of every interiority—whether of the organic or the inorganic (base-matter as such)—and in doing so, ensures the cosmic unbinding of enlightenment’s project of disenchantment. Concurrently, the cosmic reinscription of Freud’s account of the death-drive can terminate the sufficiency of capitalist participation for accelerating the disenchanting emancipation harboured by the truth of extinction. As even matter is deserted in order to unbind the abyssal realms of speculative thought, human participation for accelerating capitalist singularity loses its momentum as the bilateral aspect of participation is usurped by the unilateralizing power of the ultimate cosmic extinction. Yet the cancellation of suffi-

ciency neither guarantees an immaculate future for enlightenment nor provides adequate reasons as to why senseless human participations in capitalism must be stopped. Brassier’s cosmic reinscription of Freud’s model only manages to successfully eliminate the vitalistic horizon implicit in the antihumanist definition of capitalism proposed by Land. Yet it leaves the aporetic truth of capitalism as an inevitable singularity for dissipation bound to the conservative order of the anthropic horizon unharmed. By leaving the fundamental body and the primary front of the Landian definition of capitalism unharmed, Brassier’s own project of enlightenment ironically turns into a dormant ethico-political enterprise with an utopianistic twist. Brassier’s account of eliminativist enlightenment, in this sense, basks in the comforts of an utopianistic trust in opportunities brought about by the neurocognitive plasticity whilst peacefully cohabiting with capitalism on the same earth.

In the next section, we shall see why Brassier’s cosmic reinscription of Freud’s energetic model fails to disturb the integrity of capitalism as a singularity for dissolution adopted by the economic order of the human organism in its accelerating pursuit for intensive preservation and extensive sustenance (complexification). In this regard, we shall elaborate how singling out certain aspects of Freud’s theory of thanatropic regression enables Land to erroneously attribute antihumanist and hence disenchantingly emancipative aspects to capitalism. Also in the same vein, we shall argue that the persuasion of Land’s discriminating reading of Freud’s account of the death-drive ultimately renders Brassier’s cosmic reinscription of the death-drive unobjectionable and oblivious to the aporetic truth of capitalism. The next section will also attempt to answer the two questions posed at the end of section I.

III

In what seems to be the apotheosis of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud writes:

> In the last resort, what has left its mark on the development of organisms must be the history of the earth we live in and of its relation to the sun. [...] It would be in contradiction to the conservative nature of the instincts if the goal of life were a state of things which had never yet been attained. On the contrary, it must be an old state of things, an initial state from which the living entity has at one time or other departed and to which it is striving to return by the circuitous paths along which its development leads. If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for internal reasons—becomes inorganic once again—then we shall be compelled to say that ‘the aim of life is death’ and, looking backwards, that ‘inanimate things existed before living ones.’ [...] For a long time, perhaps, living substance was thus being constantly created afresh and easily dying, till decisive external influences altered in such a way as to oblige the still surviving substance to diverge ever more widely from its original course of life and to make ever more complicated détours before reaching its aim of death. These circuitous paths to death, faithfully kept to by the conservative instincts, would thus present us to-day with the picture of the phenomena of life.15

Freud then explicitly characterizes the nature of this thanatropic tendency as a monopolistic regime of death supported by economical limits and conservative conditions of the organism:

> They [self-preservative instincts] are component instincts whose function it is to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism it-

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We have no longer to reckon with the organism’s puzzling determination (so hard to fit into any context) to maintain its own existence in the face of every obstacle. What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion.16

Freud’s account of the death-drive or theory of thanatropic regression consists of three interconnected aspects, a speculative daemon with a tri-lobed head. Despite having their own lines of speculative thought with their respective consequences, these three aspects are intricately connected and cannot operate without each other. For the sake of analytical precision, we shall dissect these lobes or interconnected aspects as follows:

1. The first aspect (the disenchanting / objectifying truth of extinction): The organism (as an index of interiority) temporally extends from the inorganic state yet it is energetically driven—by all means and at all costs—to its precursor exteriority by flexing its contraction back to the inorganic (decontraction). The thanatropic regression aims toward a death whose reality can neither be indexed as a past state (hence not susceptible to retrogressive experience) nor a future point (hence independent of the reality of the organism). The reality of the originary death is exorbitantly exterior to conditions of life to which it traumatically gives rise to. Thanatropic regression harbours the disenchanting truth of extinction as an anterior posteriority whose actual yet independent objectivity and unilateral demand for objectification make it inassimilable for transcendental subjectivity. Since the actuality and independence of extinction concurrently precede and supersede existential temporality, extinction is thus irreducible to varieties of death-spiritualism.

2. The second aspect (the praxis of dissipation): Although the thanatropic regression toward the precursor exteriority is unilateralized by the precursor exteriority, its dynamic course and economy follows the conservative nature of the organism. The dissipative tendency, or more accurately, the course of decontraction toward the originary exorbitant death is shaped by the conservative nature of the organism. The energetic incongruity between the dysteleologic death and the organic conservative nature (i.e. the medium-course) causes the thanatropic regression to be topologically, dynamically and economically conceived as a twist or an inflective curve. Life, in this sense, is an inflection of death. Despite the inevitability of death, life’s dynamic and economic twist opens up convoluted horizons for participation. The umwege of life or the inflection of death is twistedly open to praxis (hence the possibility of political intervention and economic participation).

3. The third aspect (the dictatorial tendency of affordance): Since the course and the medium of thanatropic regression are determined by the economic order and conservative conditions of the organism, the modus operandi of the organism’s dissipative tendency is subjected to the quantitative and qualitative reductions dictated by the economical affordability of the organism. To put it differently, conservative conditions of the organism impose an economical restriction on the dissipative tendency of the organism so that the organism only dies in those ways which are immanent to, or more precisely, affordable for it. The organism can only follow its own affordable and thus economically conservative path to death in order to decontract. Accelerating the dissipative tendency through political and economic praxis, therefore, does not lead to divergence

from the conservative economy, but to the intensive re-enactment of such economy’s dictatorial foundations in regard to death.

4. According to what we elaborated earlier in section II, Land's libidinal materialist conception of capitalism as an inhumanist praxis which is open to the liquidating process of emancipation accentuates the second aspect of Freud's model. Yet at the same time, it also relatively adopts the first aspect of Freud's account of the death-drive within the terrestrial or rather a non-ubiquitous scope. Consequently, in Land's account of capitalism the politico-economic praxis (conceived by the detours and anomalies of life) meets and coincides with the cosmic vector of emancipation. Yet, through the cosmic reinscription of the first aspect, Brassier elegantly shows that the emancipative truth of extinction ultimately annuls the vitalistic proclivities in the second aspect and widens the scope of emancipation from the terrestrial to the cosmic. And it is this cosmic unbinding that inflicts a decisive blow against the sufficiency of human interests and desires surreptitiously integrated within capitalism as propulsive elements. Brassier cosmically reinscribes the first aspect of Freud's theory of thanatropic regression in order to extend the eliminativist / disenchanting vector of enlightenment all the way to the cosmic exteriority as the unilateralizing truth for the mobilization of speculative thought. However, Brassier's cosmic reinscription of Freud's account of the death-drive also results in the cosmic unbinding of the second aspect (viz. the theory of umwege) which is inseparable from the first. Yet in this case the increasing convolutions of the dissipative tendency do not suggest new opportunities for prolonging the life of thought. Instead these mazy convolutions bespeak of a twisted chain of traumatically nested horizons of interiorities which must be deserted or betrayed, one in favour of another. Here umwege presents a graph for the external objectification of thought, a turning inside-out of thought whereby the commitment to thought is supplanted by the treachery of the object on behalf of extinction. This is why Brassier's cosmic reinscription of the first aspect ingeniously conjures a shadow of a non-vitalist ethics or a desertifying politics of eliminativism which aims at objectifying every horizon of interiority (including thought and embodiment) so as to expose them to the desertifying vector of eliminativism. However, both Land and Brassier seem to remain oblivious to the implications of the third aspect (viz. the dictatorial tendency of affordance) and exclude it from their calculations in regard to capitalism and enlightenment.

Life of the organism is determined by the way it must return to the inorganic state. Human life, correspondingly, is determined by the human's path to its precursor exteriority. The thanatropic regression which registers itself as a dissipative tendency for matter and energy is conducted through this path. Such a path for human is drawn by the conservative conditions of the human organism. We call this conservative regime of the open system or the organism which forces the dissipation or the thanatropic regression to be in conformity to the dynamic capacity of the organism or the organism's affordable economy of dissipation, necrocracy. In short, necrocracy suggests the strictures of the conservative economy not in regard to life but in regard to ways the organism dies; and it is the way of returning to the originary death that prescribes the course of life for the organism. Accordingly, necrocracy does not imply that every life
brings with it the *de facto* reign of death from the beginning or that living is submitting to the rule of death. Instead necrocracy suggests that the organism must die or bind the precursor exteriority only in ways that its conservative conditions or economic order can afford. The principle of affordability in regard to the fashion of the thanatropic regression strictly conforms to the economic order of the organism, but it is primarily conditioned by the exorbitance and the inevitability of death postulated by the anterior or posteriority of extinction. Hence, necrocracy is decided by conservative conditions of the living agency which cannot repel the inevitability of death, nor can it unconditionally return to the inorganic state.

As we shall later elaborate, the unconditionality of death or extinction must not be confused with the conditionality of returning to the originary death. The latter is imposed by the formation of the organism where capacities and conditions for conservation are inextricable from terms of decontraction posited by the unconditional death. For the living agency, the path to death is dictated by its dynamic capacity for conservation which can only afford to die or dissipate according to conditions posed by the intensive and extensive factors of affordability. Affordability, in this sense, is the correlation between the economy of sustenance and the excess of the outside which manifests in the economical correlation between the complicative introgression and the explicative progression of the organism or open system. For this reason, the emerging complexity of the living agency which corresponds with its ability to temporally postpone death and convert the acquired time to capitalizable ‘interest’ for the living organism bespeaks of nothing but the affordable way to die or dissipate. In its tendency for complexification, axiomatic assimilation of all resources and insistence upon an internal autonomy despite its accelerative movement toward meltdown, capitalism corresponds to the principles of an affordable path toward dissolution prescribed and conditioned by the conservative capacity of the anthropic system in regard to the inevitability of death.

Once the necrocratic regime of the organism—implicated in the third aspect of Freud’s account of the death-drive—is exposed, capitalism is revealed as the last conservative front which the human organism is not willing to surrender. The implications of the necrocratic regime of the organism disarm Land’s conception of emancipative ‘capitalism as a whirlwind of dissolution’ by emptying it from its seemingly inhumanist bravado. At the same time, such implications tarnish the disenchanting vector of speculative thought harboured by the truth of extinction which lies at the center of Brassier’s project. Although human, its faculties and privileges are objectified and subsequently extinguished by the truth of extinction, for the human the implications of such truth can only register in conformity with the strictly conservative aspects of the human organism. Even though the human and its wherewithal are unilaterally objectified by the truth of extinction on a cosmic level, the course of their objectification qua dissolution stringently corresponds to the intrinsic conservative formation and interiorizing terms of the anthropic sphere. The speculative vectors mobilized by the cosmic truth of extinction, therefore, are forcefully trammeled by the necrocratic regime in which the human can only bind and inflect upon ‘exorbitant death’ (Brassier) qua extinction in terms conforming to its economical order and affordability. This is to say that even though the cosmic truth of extinction points to a disenchanting moment, its locus of registration abides by the conservative economy and the restrictive affordabil-

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ity of the human organism. Since the truth of extinction is exorbitant to the organism, its wealth is always energetically subjected to the affordability of the organism. The ‘speculative opportunities’ (Brassier) of the truth of extinction, to this extent, obliquely affirm and reinforce the conservative and interiorizing truth of the human affordability. The implications of the necrocratic regime of the organism, as we shall see, outline the limits of both an emancipative conception of capitalism and the speculative opportunities generated by the truth of extinction.

IV

The necrocratic regime of the organism has two economic ramifications: (a) the conservative nature of the organism asserts that the organism should only follow its own path to death and all other ways of inflecting upon the precursor exteriority which are not immanent to, or more accurately, not affordable for the organism must be averted; (b) any change or reformation aimed at the organism’s course of life or its respective problems is ultimately in accordance with the organism’s circumscribed path to death which is affordable by and exigently in conformity to the economical order of the organism. The path to death demarcates the modal range by which the organism must die because these are the ways or modes of dissipation which are intensively and extensively affordable by the economy of the organism. Thus the second necrocratic law can also be put differently: Variations in ways of living and pursuing one way over another for the better or worse of the organism remain within the confines of the organism’s inherent economical and conservative nature which is demarcated by its restricted economy or exclusivist policy toward death. The capitalist production of lifestyles, in this sense, is nothing more than the consequence of capitalism’s submission to the necrocratic regime whereby the organism must only perish or bind negativity in ways affordable for its conservative economy. The so-called openness of capitalism toward modes of life and its obsession with life-oriented models of emancipation attests to its progressive refusal in questioning the necrocratic regime. It suggests the intrinsic inability of capitalism in posing alternative ways of inflecting upon death and binding exteriority other than those afforded by the conservative horizon. Any model of emancipation aimed at the life of the organism is confined to the monopolistic horizon of necrocracy which is in complete accordance with the economic order of the organism. Life-oriented models of emancipation merely mark the various possibilities of the organism’s life as the modi vivendi dictated by the necrocratic regime of the organism. In doing so, such models dissimulate their fundamentally restricted framework and mask their obedient nature toward the oppressive regime of necrocracy which restricts modes (modi operandi) of inflecting upon death or binding exteriority.

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18. Affordability should not be understood solely in terms of the organism but also as an economical correlation through which the continuity between the excess that gives rise to the organism and the exteriorizing excess of death can be maintained through and within the economic order of the organism or the open system.
20. Throughout the entire history of philosophy, a unanimously established law of binding has been held and maintained without interrogation. Parallel to the energetic model of organic dissipation or death, this law or axiomatic principle holds that death or cosmic exteriority can be bound in one and one way only. As a result, extinction or cosmic exteriorization always appears as a singular point of departure or pull-back (inflection) toward the precursor exteriority whose monistic path the organism cannot diverge. The establishment of this model of binding is due to the insufficiency of philosophical thought and imagination with regard to thinking extinction as contingently ‘different or alternative’ ways or courses of binding cosmic exteriority. The model of death or exteriorization as a singularity creates an impasse for thought that results
Counter-intuitively, associating inhumanism with Capital’s singularity toward dissolution is faulty if not humanly myopic. This is because the accelerative vector of Capital for dissolution strictly remains in the confines of the necrocratic regime of the organism wherein the restrictive policy in regard to modes of dissolution fundamentally abides by the conservative economy and interiorizing conditions of the (human) organism. In other words, capitalism’s dissipative tendency is deeply in thrall to the constitutional limit of the anthropic sphere in that the anthropic horizon is not fundamentally distinguished by its model(s) of life but its simultaneously restricted and restrictive attitude toward the exteriorizing death. Capitalism is, in fact, the very affordable and conservative path to death dictated by the human organism on an all-encompassing level. Capitalism does not repel the excess of the exorbitant truth of extinction as much as it economically affirms (i.e. mandates the affordability of) such an excess. The economical binding or affording of the excess of the truth of extinction is certainly an unsuccessful binding, but an essential ‘unsuccessful binding’ necessitated for underpinning the aporetic truth of capitalism without abolishing it. In fact, affording never implies a successful binding of an exorbitant truth; it is insistently an unsuccessful, or more precisely, economical binding tethered to the capacity of the conservative order. Under the economic aegis of an unsuccessfully bound truth of extinction, capitalism is able to utilize the inevitability and ubiquity of extinction to respectively feign its singularity and vindicate its assertive omnipresence. By presenting singularity and ubiquity as its undisputable verities, capitalism can craftily dissimulate its anthropic economic order as an all-inclusive and prevalent terrestrial way of binding exteriority which happens to be ‘a little inhuman’ (Land). Yet, in reality, it is the economic decision of the human organism in regard to the originary death which capitalism universalizes through politico-economic opportunities brought about by the ‘unsuccessful binding’ of the truth of extinction.

According to Freud, the organism shall only follow its own path to death. This thanatropic path consists of those modes of dissipation which are fundamentally affordable by the conservative nature of the organism. Alternative ways of returning to the originary state of dissolution are in contradiction with the conservative nature of the organism’s own way of thanatropic regression and are excluded by the necrocratic regime. Therefore, if the ultimate conception of capitalism is an accelerative and inevitable singularity of dissolution which assimilates every planetary resource, then it cannot be a radically alternative way of dissolution to those already affordable by the (human) organism. Because if capitalism was indeed a vector of dissolution external to the conservative ambit of human, it would have already been excluded and ferociously warded off by the economic order of the human organism. This is because, as we stated, it is not alternative modes of living which are staved off by the organism but alternative ways of inflecting upon the originary death and binding exteriority. For this reason, capitalism is nothing but the very mode of dissipation and dissolution which
is exclusive to the anthropic horizon because it is in complete conformity with the capacity of human's interiorized formation in its various economic configurations. Since capitalism is the fundamentally affordable way of dissipation for the economic order of the anthropic horizon, it is inherently hostile toward other modes of ‘binding exteriority’ which cannot be afforded by the anthropic horizon. In other words, the truth of capitalism's global dominance lies in its monopolistic necrocracy: A feral vigilance against all alternative ways of binding exteriority or returning to the originary death other than those which are immanent to and affordable for the anthropic horizon. Only a vigilance beyond hate and enmity but blinded by the economic order of the organism and its pressing demands can describe capitalism's actively militant and intelligent alertness against all other modes of dissolution and negativity. This vigilance manifests in capitalism's restless assimilation of every form of negativity so as to re-integrate it as another mode or style of life. In doing so, capitalism can prevent the mobilization of that negativity as an alternative way for binding exteriority and therefore, maintains its dominantly prevalent position in regard to the human.

Conditioned by the conservative formation of the organism, the economic order of the organism determines the way by which the organism must return to the originary ‘state of dissolution’. The criterion for such determination (dying in one way rather than another) is the affordability of the organism. Openness, correspondingly, is a dynamic economical correlation between the organism's intensive and extensive economic factors. The openness of the organism to the outside is conducted through an affordable path which consists of a range of activities corresponding to the economic conditions of the organism. This does not mean that the organism's economic order is oblivious to the inevitability of death or dissolution but on the contrary, it factors in the certainty of death in each and every calculation. In grasping the organic as an inflection-sequence of the inorganic, the terms of decontraction which have been unconditionally posited by the inorganic are inseparable from the conditions inherent to the contracted organic agency. Only by including the inevitability of dissolution, can the capacity simultaneously preserve the organism's conservative economy and engage in extensive / explicative activities which involve risks and hazardous expenditures. Thus more than postponing the time of death and escaping the truth of extinction, the conservative formation of the organism strives to make the unconditional death affordable and express the truth of extinction in its own economical terms. Affordability ensures that the unilaterality implied by the inevitability of extinction be economically and hence, unsuccessfully bilateralized. The aim of affordability is to make the discrepancy between the inherent desire for self-preservation and the inevitability of death consistent with the economic order of the organism. The vigilant stance against alternative paths to death infers the economic bilateralization of death's unilateral terms, because here bilateralization attests to the binding of the truth of extinction in no other terms than those of the organism and its economic order. The disenchanting influences of extinction on thought, consequently, are dampened by the economic bilateralization of death. For the anthropic horizon, such bilateral qua affordable terms conform to the truth of schizophrenically unbound capitalism as the dominantly affordable mode of dissipation or thanatropic regression. If ‘the truth of extinction’ is unsuccessfully bound as a vector of dissipation whose terms are affordable for the organism and if for the anthropic horizon capitalism stands as the dominant set of such terms, then the economical binding of the truth of extinction inaugurates the truth of capitalism.
In the end, what capitalism’s vigilance against non-dialectical forms of negativity suggests is that the exorbitant truth of extinction has been bound by the conservative terms of the anthropic horizon which are reflected in the dissipative tendency of Capital. Moreover, this axiomatic vigilance indicates that capitalism is not willing to share the truth of extinction outside of its own economically paved dissipative path. In this case, speculative opportunities brought about by the exorbitant truth of extinction contribute to the militant potency of capitalism in staving off alternative ways of binding exteriority and obstructing the remobilization of non-dialectical negativity in ways which do not conform to the economic order of the conservative horizon.

The reason for the vigilance against alternative paths of dissipation can be put in simple terms: The organism insists on binding death only in its own terms. These terms are the conditions inherent to the organism’s capacity to conserve and respectively, its affordability to mobilize such conservation in any direction. Correspondingly, these terms are the economical premises which mark the boundaries of the organism and determine its conception. What primarily forces the organism to fashion its own path to death is the impossibility of bargaining the compulsory terms of an exorbitant death. In other words, it is the unilaterality of extinction—the traumatically exorbitant immensity of the truth of extinction—which inspires and contributes to the organism’s exclusivist regime of dissipation. For the anthropic horizon, capitalism corresponds to such a necrocratic regime whereby inflecting upon the originary death and binding exteriority are conducted in terms which strictly conform to the conservative formation of the interiorized horizon. Consequently, it is the exorbitant immensity of the truth of extinction that inspires the emergence and acceleration of capitalism as the economically affordable tendency for dissipation and liquidation. When it comes to an exorbitant truth, whether it is of the sun or cosmic extinction, the speculative choices are limited to how the exorbitant wealth (speculative opportunities?) is to be squandered. This dictum lies at the heart of capitalism as the speculative consequence of an exorbitant truth for which the traumatic compulsion for squandering must intertwine and unite with the inherently conservative economy of affording more. Capitalism’s incessant production of modi vivendi (courses of life) is the result of capturing the compulsory and exorbitant terms of extinction in bilateral and affordable terms. This is because the possibility of living is guaranteed by these bilateral terms according to which death can be exigenously approached in terms of the organic capacity and its interiorizing affordability. Accordingly, contra Land’s dismissal of the third aspect of Freud’s energetic model as a ‘security hallucination’, the organic necrocracy does not make death subordinate to the organism, it is on the contrary the result of full subordination to death.21

The exclusivist stance of the organism in regard to its path to death is the very expression of the insurmountable truth of death within the organic horizon as a dissipative tendency which is supposed to mobilize the conservative conditions of the organism toward death. Unconditional submission to death—or a death whose path is not paved by the economic terms of the organism—bespeaks of the impossibility of the temporality of the organic life from the outset. A death that does not allow the organism to die in its own terms is a death that usurps all conditions required for the organism’s ‘own path to death’ is a security hallucination, screening out death’s path through the organism. ‘[T]he organism wishes to die only in its own fashion,’ he writes, as if death were specifiable, privatizable, subordinate to a reproductive order [...]’ Land, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 481.
ic differentiation and temporary survival. Yet the contingent and undeniably scarce instances of organic life and transient survival imply that the thanatropic regression is merely unconditional in regard to the inevitable unilateralizing power of death, but in terms of its ‘course of conduction’ it is conditional. The inevitability of death does not point to its absolute unconditionality but rather to the compulsive attempt of the organism to bind its precursor exteriority by mustering all its own intensive and extensive economic conditions toward dissolution. The detours of life are drawn not because death should be unconditionally embraced but because the organism is itself the inflection of death, a slope-curve between the inevitability of death and conservative conditions of the organism. It is this very conception of organism as a differential ratio between the insurmountable truth of death and conservative organic conditions for binding such a truth that brings about the possibility of acceleration or hastening toward dissolution. Yet, as we argued, such hastening is not a radical embracing of the exorbitant truth of extinction, but rather an affordable and hence, a purely economical (unsuccessful) way of binding the excess of such a truth. It is the unbindable excess of the truth of extinction—as that which cannot be circumvented—that necessitates such an affordable way of binding within the economic order of the organism. And it is this affordable binding that can indeed be conceived in terms of acceleration.22

V

A simultaneously inhumanist and emancipative conception of capitalism as a runway for imaginative (speculative?) praxis is a hastily crafted chimera. This is not because capitalism is not really a partially repressed desire for meltdown but because the image of capitalism as a planetary singularity for dissipation testifies to its rigid conformity to the anthropic horizon which only follows an affordable path to death. In doing so, capitalism as a twisted dissipative tendency rigidly wards off all other ways of dissolution and binding exteriority which are not immanent to or affordable for the anthropic horizon. This is because the conservative obligation of the dominant dissipative tendency (viz. the organic path to dissolution) is to thwart any disturbance which might be directed at the bilateral or conservative approach of the organism to death. At the same time, the insistence on speculative opportunities begotten by the disenchanting truth of extinction qua ‘anterior posteriority’ is a bit more than a philosophical overconfidence in the enlightening consummation of nihilism and an underestimation of anthropomorphic trickeries. For as we argued, in the ambit of the organism the exorbitant truth of extinction registers as a conservative path to extinction, which is to say, it is bound as a mediocrementally affordable truth. On the other hand, we argued that the exorbitant truth of extinction inspires and contributes to the dominantly necrocratic dissipative tendency of the organism which in the case of the anthropic horizon forms the truth of capitalism. For this reason, the truth of extinction is not sufficient to guarantee either the imaginative praxis of capitalism or speculative opportunities harboured by the nihilistic sublimation of the Enlightenment. The ostensibly inhumanist creativities of capitalism and the speculative implications of a cosmological eliminativism respectively become parts of an anti-humanist convention or a nihilist lore which ultimately

22. Whilst for Land the possibility of accelerating capitalism rests on the economical binding of an exorbitant index of exteriority within the energetic scope of the organism, for Brassier the possibility of philosophical binding of extinction can only be anchored by an economical binding of the exorbitant truth of extinction. This economical binding can be understood in terms of a deepened Freudian account of trauma whose topology and energetic model are casually engaged and strategically affirmed by both Land and Brassier.
and ironically lack a cunning vision of doom. The blunt confidence of both in the truth of extinction as either that which mysteriously sorts everything out or the gate-opener of speculative vistas sterilized of human mess, voluntary or not, contributes to the truth of capitalism without bothering to disturb its comfort zones.

It is the registering of the exorbitant truth of extinction as an affordable dissipative tendency that enables the organism to actively but economically (viz. unsuccessfully) bind extinction. And it is the economical binding of extinction as a guarantor for active dissipation that forces the organism to take an exclusivist policy toward other possible ways of binding the originary death or loosening into exteriority qua non-conceptual negativity. Whereas the former impediment in regard to the truth of extinction complicates ventures of speculative thought, the latter obstacle imposed by the exclusive policy toward alternative ways of binding exteriority sets a major limit against the possibility of having a politico-economical counterpart for speculative thought. Yet as we stated in the beginning, once these limits come to light, philosophical thought and political praxis can either attempt to breach them or move in another direction where such impasses have less paralyzing influence. At this point, we shall briefly touch on some of the purely conjectural alternatives brought about by the unveiling of the aforementioned limits.

If we identify the life of the anthropic horizon—of both human material hardware and thought—as a set of dynamic yet affordable and exclusivist ways for the anthropic horizon to bind the precursor exteriority, then we can tentatively define the Inhuman by the possibility of alternative ways of binding exteriority qua concept-less negativity. The Inhuman, respectively, is outlined by those ways of binding exteriority or complicity with non-conceptual negativity which are not immanent to the anthropic horizon and betray the economical order of the anthropic horizon in regard to exteriority. Such alternatives do not simply suggest dying in ways other than those prescribed by the organism, but rather the mobilization of forms of non-dialectical negativity which can neither be excluded by the dominant dissipative tendency of the anthropic horizon nor can be fully sublated by its order. For this reason, these remobilized forms of non-dialectical negativity should not be completely unaffordable or external to the economical order, for such absolute resistance to conservative conditions or exteriority to the affordability of the horizon is indexed as an exorbitant negativity. As we showed earlier, this is precisely the un-affordability of the exorbitant negativity qua death—as that which is foreclosed to negotiation—that inspires the conservatively necrocratic approach of the organism toward exteriority. And it is the insistence on affording (viz. economically affirming) such an exorbitant and externalized negativity that turns into a compulsion for the organism to exclude other possible ways of binding exteriority. Such exclusion is conducted through the compulsive elimination of all traces of non-dialectical negativity other than those affordable by the economic order of the horizon. Consequently, it is the compulsive elimination of alternative traces of non-dialectical qua unilateralizing negativity that forestalls the unfolding of speculative thought and its praxis. However, just as these mobilized forms of non-dialectical negativity should not be posited as indexes of exorbitant externality, they should not succumb to a consistently positive status for affirming and re-enacting the conservative horizon either.

In order to charge and remobilize traces of non-dialectical negativity as alternative ways of binding exteriority, the negativity should neither affirm the conservative horizon nor posit itself as exorbitantly external to it. Such a remobilization of non-dia-
lectical negativity, to this extent, brings to mind the treacherous pragmatics of the Insider—an interiorized yet inassimilable (unilateralized) negativity which uses the economical affordability of the conservative horizon as an alternative medium for the eruption of exteriority. The remobilization of non-dialectical negativity as the so-called Insider, for this reason, requires an equivocal conception of the void as its principle of negativity. This is because an equivocal conception of the void does not celebrate its exteriority as an exorbitant externality which enforces negativity in the form of a conservative dissipative tendency to the outside (extensive subtraction). The equivocal conception of the void not only brings about the possibility of negativity but also makes such negativity infectious, for equivocality here means that the void as the principle of negativity is intensively and problematically open to interiorizing terms and conditions of the conservative horizon without ceasing to be exterior or losing its inassimilable negativity. Since the equivocal conception of the void can be interiorized but cannot be assimilated, it interiorizes non-dialectical negativity’s ‘power of incision’ (Brassier) as the creativity of perforation which effectuates the inassimilability qua unilaterality of negativity as a nested exteriority that loosens itself within the interiorized horizon. Only the acceleration of a world-capitalism perforated by such insider conceptions of non-dialectical negativity is tantamount to the metastatic propagation of an exteriorizing terror which is too close to the jugular vein of capital to be either left alone or treated.

In short, the equivocal conception of the void as the principle of negativity mobilizes a logic of negativity that does not require operating on an exorbitantly external level or turning into a positive salvation. Whilst the exorbitant conception of negativity as an external index of resistance feeds capitalism’s conservative impetus for widening its limits (affording more), the positive stance of affirmation is an artless re-enactment of the conservative horizon. Therefore, the programmatic objective of an inhuman praxis is to remobilize non-dialectical negativity beyond such Capital-nurturing conceptions of negativity. Without such a programmatic sponsor, alternative ethics of openness or politics of exteriorization, the speculative vectors of thought are not only vulnerable to the manipulations of capitalism but also are seriously impeded.

One can reformulate the limits discussed in this essay in terms of the limits implicit in the terrestrial image of thought. If according to Freud, the development of the organism is molded by the extensive correlation between the earth and the sun, then what are the implications of this relation for the terrestrial thought? For it seems that the earth’s conservative-dissipative correlation with the sun has entrenched its traces in thought as a dominant model for the economy, topology and dynamism of life. This is not just because a major part of formations on the planet (including all human endeavours) are directly contingent upon the sun, but also because the sun’s exorbitant exteriority ingrains a conservative image of exteriority in thought. Such exorbitant exteriority can only be bound as an affordable dissipative tendency which rigidly limits the image of exteriority and in doing so, restricts all other possible ways for binding exteriority. The energetic sun-earth axis has become a burdening chain for the terrestrial image of thought insofar as it constitutes the exclusivist model of death and dissipation

which restricts the scope of thought in regard to its own death. The question, to this extent, is how to break the hegemonic model of the sun in regard to death and exteriority without submitting to another star, another horizon or even investing in the truth of extinction whose exorbitance leads to restrictions reminiscent of those imposed by solar excess. Does the speculative unbinding of terrestrial thought from the sun as an exclusivist mode of dissipation which must be afforded by all means require a different conception of terrestriality that binds exteriority in different modes other than those prescribed by the solar economy? Or does such a task require a vector of thought capable of circumventing the earth so as to evade the limits posed by the solar economy, the order of economical affordability and the restrictive image of exteriority immanent to it? But then what is the relation of such thought that has dispossessed itself of its immediate resources with ‘extralimital idealism’?