Capitalism and the Non-Philosophical Subject

Nick Srnicek

The real problem is not how to intervene in the world of philosophy, such as it supposedly subsists in itself, or how to transform it from within. The problem is how to use philosophy so as to effect a real transformation of the subject in such a way as to allow it to break the spell of its bewitchment by the world and enable it to constitute itself through a struggle with the latter.

—François Laruelle

After being stuck within the self-imposed limits of discourse, subjectivity, and culture for far too long, through this collection it is clear that continental philosophy is at last making a push away from the artificial constraints of correlationism—the presupposition that being and thought must necessarily be reciprocally related. One of the main themes running throughout all of these diverse thinkers is a fierce desire to break through the finitude of anthropomorphism and finally move away from the myopic and narcissistic tendencies of much recent philosophy. In particular, the non-philosophical movement assembled within the work of François Laruelle and Ray Brassier has examined the way in which the form of philosophy has continually idealized the immanence of the Real by making it reciprocally dependent upon the philosophical system which purports to, at last, grasp it. In contrast to philosophies which aim at the Real, non-philosophy provides the most intriguing conceptual tools to begin thinking ‘in accordance with’ the Real. However, while the undeniably useful, in-

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4. It should be made explicit here that we will not be entering into a discussion of alternative readings of Laruelle. For our purposes, it is Brassier who has made clear the realist implications of Laruelle and so this essay will focus solely on Brassier’s reading of Laruelle. There are two main differences between Laruelle’s and Brassier’s work. The first is that Brassier refuses the universal scope that Laruelle attributes to philosophical Decision. The second can be seen in their respective identifications of radical immanence—whereas Laruelle will end up privileging the subject Man, Brassier will instead argue that real immanence is of the object qua being-nothing. See: Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, New York,
teresting, and important philosophical work that has been done by non-philosophical thinkers is significant in itself, there is nonetheless a notable absence so far when it comes to issues of subjectivity and politics. Laruelle’s own works on Marxism have been largely formalistic and unconcerned with practical or ontic politics. Brassier, on the other hand, has acknowledged the importance of politics in a number of essays, but has not yet developed a systematic account of how non-philosophy changes our relation to everyday politics. The risk in the meantime, however, is that the multi-faceted work of these thinkers appears to outsiders as simply an interesting, but ultimately useless theoretical venture. This is especially pertinent considering the radically nihilistic project of Brassier—one which could easily be taken to eliminate the very possibility of politics through its welding together of the implications of cosmological annihilation, eliminative materialism, non-philosophy, and the nihilistic drive of the Enlightenment project. So the question becomes, what sort of insights can non-philosophy offer that have not already been given by deconstruction, psychoanalysis, feminism, or Marxism? It is the aim of this paper to begin to answer these types of questions, beginning by first examining non-philosophy and its particular type of subject in more depth. We will then see how the self-sufficiency of Deleuze and Guattari’s capitalist socius can be opened up through a non-Decisional approach, and finally we will develop some preliminary thoughts on what non-philosophy can provide for a political project.

Prior to beginning this project, it will undoubtedly be of use to first examine the rudiments of non-philosophy as articulated by Brassier and Laruelle. The near-complete absence of Laruelle’s work in English makes it a widely overlooked—although increasingly less so—position in the English-speaking world. To add to this linguistic divide is the sheer difficulty of Laruelle’s writing and the intricacy of his project. In this regards, Brassier and John Mullarkey have provided an admirable service in their exporting of this French thinker to the English-speaking world. In addition, Brassier has also made his idiosyncratic reconstruction of Laruelle available online. With that easily attainable and comprehensive resource available, we feel justified in limiting our discussion of Laruelle here to only the most pertinent points.

NON-PHILOSOPHY

Non-philosophy, in its most basic sense, is an attempt to limit philosophy’s pretensions in the name of the Real of radical immanence. It is an attempt to shear immanence of any constitutive relation with the transcendences of thought, language, or any other form of ideality, thereby revealing the Real’s absolute determining power—indeed, independently-of and indifferently-to any reciprocal relation with ideality. It is true that numerous philosophies have proclaimed their intentions to achieve immanence, with a number of them going to great lengths to eschew all ideality and reach a properly immanent and real-

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6. Laruelle has described this subject as ‘the Stranger’, while Brassier has preferred to describe it as an ‘Alien-subject’ evoking the radical alterity which science fiction has attempted to attain.


ist beginning. What Laruelle reveals, however, is that all these previous attempts have been hindered—not by their content, which is overtly materialist, but rather by their very form of philosophizing. It is this form which Laruelle gives the name of Decision.9 Even materialist philosophies are turned into idealisms by Decision making them reliant on a synthesis constituted by and through thought. Put simply, through Decision, philosophy has continually objectified the Real within its own self-justified terms.

Decision is the constitutive self-positing and self-giving gesture of philosophy, and one which invariably (and problematically) makes philosophy circular and reciprocally constitutive of the Real. In its simplest form, Decision consists of three elements: (1) a presupposed empirical datum—the conditioned; (2) a posited a priori faktum—the specific conditions; and (3) their posited as given synthetic unity.10 What is important to note, to avoid confusion, is that the datum and the faktum here are structural positions capable of being filled in with a wide variety of content (such as phenomena/phenomenality, known/knower, ekstasis/enstasis, conditioned/condition, actual/virtual, presence/archi-text, etc.). As such, Laruelle can plausibly argue that philosophy has invariably made use of this structure, despite the obvious historical diversity of philosophies.11 In any particular philosophy, these terms are established through the method of transcendental deduction that comprises philosophical Decision.12 Faced with an always-already given, indivisible immanence, philosophy proceeds by first drawing a distinction between an empirical faktum and its a priori categorial conditions. From this presupposed empirical data, its specific a priori categorial conditions are derived. Secondly, these derived categories are unified into a single transcendental Unity acting as their universally necessary condition—the original synthetic unity that makes all other syntheses possible. On this basis, we can now move in the opposite direction to the third step, whereby the transcendental Unity is used to derive the way in which the categories provide the conditions for the empirical, i.e. the way in which they are all synthesized (and systematized) together. With this three-step process in mind, we can see why Laruelle claims that Decision finds its essential moment in the Unity of the transcendental deduction. This Unity (which is a unity by virtue of synthesizing the datum and faktum into a hybrid of both, not because it need be objectified or subjectified—hence even Derrida’s differance and Deleuze’s intensive difference13 can be included as examples) acts both as the immanent presupposition of the transcendental method and the transcendent result/generator of the presupposed empirical and posited a priori. In other words, this dyad of faktum and datum is presupposed as immanently given in ex-

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9. As should become apparent, Decision constitutes the essence of philosophy for Laruelle, so that when he speaks of ‘non-philosophy’ this should be taken as a synonym for non-Decisional philosophy. In this regards, Laruelle’s own work is a non-Decisional form of philosophy, rather than the simple renunciation of philosophy. We will follow Laruelle’s use of ‘philosophy’, however its specificity should be kept in mind when we move to the more explicit political sections of this paper. There we will see that capitalism itself operates as a philosophy.

10. There is a more complicated version of Decision that Brassier outlines, but for our purposes this version will suffice. The interested reader, however, can find more here: Brassier, ‘Alien Theory’, p. 155.

11. While the universalist claims of this philosophical structure are debatable, much like Meillassoux’s correlationist structure, it does appear to be common to nearly all post-Kantian philosophies.


13. To be clear, while it is true that Deleuze’s intensive difference in fact indexes a splitting, it does so only by simultaneously joining together what it splits. This is precisely the synthetic mixture that Brassier will denounce as inevitably idealist.
perience and derived as the transcendental conditions for this experience. Unsurprisingly then, philosophy's inaugural distinction between a datum and a faktum finds only the synthesis of this distinction as the end result of the transcendental method, a synthesis which then circles back to validate philosophy's initial distinction. Thus, the gesture of Decision effectively determines not only the synthetic unity/hybrid, but also the nature of the empirical and the a priori as the moments of this synthetic unity. As a result, Decision makes philosophy ubiquitous—everything becomes material for philosophy to think, and philosophy becomes co-extensive with (and co-determining of) reality.

Against this imperial form of philosophy, non-philosophy will resolutely refrain from attempting to think immanence or to establish any relation between philosophy and the Real (even as its absolute Other). What is called for, through a suspension of Decision, is a non-reflexive non-philosophy; one which would not be inaugurated by a reflexive decision determining the nature of the Real in advance. Non-philosophy will not be a thought of the Real, but rather a thought according to the Real. With this in mind, it suffices to postulate—not a thought adequate to it—a type of experience of the Real which escapes from self-position, which is not a circle of thought and the Real, a One which does not unify but remains in-One, a Real which is immanent (to) itself rather than to a form of thought, to a 'logic', etc. It is this Real as the radically immanent One, which provides the means for non-philosophy to break free of and explain philosophy's vicious circle. It is this radical immanence which we mentioned before was always already given prior to philosophy's Decision. This indivisible One is radically indifferent to thought and to the determinations involved within the philosophical Decision. Thus, speaking of it involves axioms—entirely immanent descriptions posited by the Real itself—rather than referential statements. On the basis of its indivisibility, we must also uphold that prior to any philosophical positing of a 'Decisional transcendence/non-Decisional immanence' dualism, this separation is always already given. Moreover, as outside of philosophical positing, the One can be given without the philosophical requirement of a transcendental mode of givenness. In other words, the Real qua One can be described as the (admittedly unwieldy) always-already-given-without-givenness. All of this does not, however, entail that it is radically isolated from language, thought, etc.—which would return it to an external transcendence—instead it is simply not involved in a reciprocal relation with these transcendences of philosophical Decisions. It is indifferent to philosophical determinations (such as predication or definition, whether through the mediums of thought or language), not external to them.

15. We will see in the section on unilateral duality that one reason for describing the Real as 'One' is because it is devoid of all differentiating relations. Relations fall solely within the ambit of philosophy. To be clear, however, the One does not entail a unity in any sense, and the Real itself is ontologically inconsistent. The One is indifferent to any philosophical characterization in terms of unity/multiplicity.
16. In some sense, Laruelle’s project can be seen as a radical continuation of Husserl’s project to begin with ultimate immanence. But whereas Husserl and every phenomenologist afterwards have characterized immanence in relation to some other basic term, Laruelle is suspending the self-sufficiency of all these determinations.
17. As Brassier helpfully notes, it is not that the Real is ineffable (which would be again to separate it from philosophy), but rather that it is ‘inexhaustively effable as what determines its own effability’. (Personal communication, 1/26/09) Or in other words, it is not a matter of concepts determining the Real, but of the Real determining the concepts appropriate to it.
But the skeptical critic will immediately ask—does not the distinction between the One and the Decisional dyad reintroduce precisely the dualism of Decision? To counter this claim, Laruelle will answer that instead of the difference being presupposed and posited by a philosophical Decision, it is instead posited as already given. From philosophy’s perspective, the difference must be constituted by philosophy’s gestures of separation; but from the non-philosophical perspective, what is given (without-given-ness) is its already achieved separation. Furthermore, what this separation separates is the realm of separability itself (i.e. philosophy and its systems of relations) from the Inseparable as that which is indifferent to philosophical distinctions. This Inseparable does not oppose philosophy, nor does it negate it—rather it simply suspends its self-sufficient autonomy in order to open it up to determination by the radically immanent Real. We will later on have a chance to more fully examine these claims in light of the concept of ‘unilateral duality’.

With all this in mind, we must now broach the more pertinent question: what does non-philosophy do? We have outlined some of the basis axioms of non-philosophy and set out its understanding of philosophy, but when we put it into action what does this theory achieve? First and foremost, we must realize that non-philosophy is not a discourse about radical immanence, but rather a means to explain philosophy. Radical immanence is simply the invariant X that is posited as always-already-given-without-givenness. The Real is unproblematic—by virtue of being always-already-given, the interesting question becomes how to proceed from the immanent Real to the transcendence of philosophy. As Brassier puts it, ‘it is the consequences of thinking philosophy immanently that are interesting, not thinking immanence philosophically’. Philosophy—with its Decisional auto-positional structure—is constitutively unable to account for itself, which leaves non-philosophy as the sole means to do so. What this entails is that philosophy is not merely an extraneous, impotent and ultimate useless endeavour. Rather, from the perspective of non-philosophy, philosophy itself must be taken as the material without which non-philosophy would be inoperative (while, for its part, the Real would remain indifferent regardless). The operation performed here, as we will now see, is given the name of ‘cloning’ by Laruelle. It is this approach which will suspend the self-sufficiency of philosophical thought and remove the limits imposed by a particular philosophy in order to attain a thinking in accordance with the Real. In other words, we are entering onto the terrain of the non-philosophical subject.

THE NON-PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT

Cloning, in a general sense, refers to the way in which philosophy can be acted upon by the Real through non-philosophical thinking. Given a philosophical system, the initial step of cloning is to locate the specific dyad constitutive of its Decision. The ‘real’
term is then isolated, broken apart from its constitutive relation to the other ‘ideal’ term. For instance, the virtual would be isolated from the actual in Deleuze’s system as the term designating its pretension to grasp Being. Lastly, this real term ‘is identified as the Real, an ‘as if’ identification that performs rather than represents the Real.’ In this subtle shift, non-philosophy effectively instantiates its experimental approach: it operates through the hypothetical question of ‘what if this philosophy was not about the Real, but rather determined by the Real?’ Cloning, in other words, suspends the auto-sufficiency of philosophical Decision in order to open it onto determination-in-the-last-instance by radical immanence.

Considering the significance of this notion of determination-in-the-last-instance, it is important to provide some clarification about its nature. The most recent use of this concept comes from Louis Althusser who used it to explain how the Marxist base and superstructure operated together. Contrary to standard Marxism, Althusser accorded the superstructure some measure of relative autonomy, while nevertheless arguing that the economy was determining-in-the-last-instance. This entailed that while the superstructure had some effective power within social formations, it was the economy which ultimately determined how much power it had. The determination-in-the-last-instance determined the effective framework for the relative autonomy of the superstructure. What Laruelle criticizes in this account, however, is the ultimately relative nature of the determination-in-the-last-instance—the fact that it finds its last instance in the economy rather than Real immanence. As he will argue, ‘The Real is not, properly speaking, an ‘instance’ or a ‘sphere’, or eventually a ‘region’, to the degree that, by definition, it does not belong to the thought-world or to the World—this is the meaning of the ‘last instance’? Whereas Althusser relativizes the last-instance to the economy, thereby incorporating it within a philosophical Decision as to the nature of materialism, Laruelle will argue for the last-instance to stem from the properly non-philosophical understanding of matter. The last-instance, for Laruelle, must escape any sort of relative and regional determination—as an empirically given base, or as a relative structuralist position. Only the Real as radical immanence can provide a sufficient base, otherwise one invariably makes the last-instance relative to its philosophical definition.

Similarly, ‘determination’ also undergoes a non-philosophical reinvention. As Laruelle says, “Determination” is not an auto-positional act, a Kantian-critical operation of the primacy of the determination over the determined. Here the reverse primacy is already announced without a return to dogmatism, yet still under an ambiguous form. It is the determined, the real as matter-without-determination, that makes the determination.’ The determined here is the real as last-instance—that presupposition of philosophy which itself escapes from all philosophical determination as the always-already determined in-itself. It determines, in turn, the philosophical world, acting as the last-instance which determines the framework for the relative autonomy of philosophy. The nature of this determination, however, must also escape from all metaphysical concepts of causation: ‘It is not an ontic and regional concept with a physico-chemical or linguistic-structuralist model: nor ontological (formal, final, efficient, and … material, which Marx forgets to exclude with the other forms of metaphysical

causality). As such, it is a type of determination which is itself indifferent to what it determines, while maintaining its radical immanence to what it determines. This entails that the real as last-instance must take up two simultaneous readings: ‘in order not to render immanence relative to that which it transcendentally determines, Laruelle will carefully distinguish immanence as a necessary but negative condition, as sine qua non for the relation of determination, from its effectuation as transcendentally determining condition insofar as this is contingently occasioned by the empirical instance that it necessarily determines.

It is cloning which effectuates the second aspect, by suspending the auto-sufficiency of the intra-philosophical conditions (which comprise a vicious circle), and opening them onto the transcendental conditions for the particular empirical instance determined-in-the-last-instance by radical immanence. What is cloned, however? The real foreclosure of the Real to Decision is cloned as a non-philosophical transcendental thought foreclosed to Decision. These two foreclosures are themselves Identical-in-the-last-instance, yet the Real itself is foreclosed to the clone (i.e. non-philosophical thought). We must be careful to distinguish then, between (1) the Real foreclosure of radical immanence and (2) the transcendental foreclosure of non-philosophical thought. This non-philosophical thinking, in the end, simply is the ‘unilateral duality’ established between the Real qua determining force and Decision qua determinable material. It is the ‘force-(of)-thought’ or the ‘organon’ as the determining instance through which the philosophical material has its pretensions to absolute autonomy suspended by being taken as material determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real. Or, to put it in other words, non-philosophical thought doubles the separation ‘between’ immanence and philosophy with a transcendental unilateral duality ‘between’ the force-(of)-thought and the specific philosophical material in question. Importantly, the philosophical instance which provides the material from which the Real’s foreclosure can be cloned is itself non-determining—i.e. there is no subtle reintegration of a bilateral relation between thought and the Real here. Rather the unilateral duality—as the non-relation between the clone and Decision—guarantees their non-reciprocity.

This unilateral duality must be carefully distinguished from the more common notion of a unilateral relation. Whereas philosophy has typically taken the unilateral relation to be one where ‘X distinguishes itself from Y without Y distinguishing itself from X in return,” it has also inevitably reintroduced a reciprocal relation at a higher level—that of the philosopher overlooking the relation from a transcendent position. In non-philosophy, this transcendence is clearly untenable. Instead, what unilateral duality refers to is the way in which philosophy distinguishes itself from the force-(of)-thought, but with an additional unilateralizing of the initial unilateral duality. Thus, the distinction between the force-(of)-thought and philosophy is operative only on the side of philosophy. Only within philosophy can one presume to take a transcendent perspective on its (non-)separation from philosophy (this, again, points to the illusory self-sufficiency of the philosophical Decision). In the end, and despite some loose use of words earlier to ease the reader into non-philosophy, it must always be remembered


26. ‘Empirical’ here refers to philosophy as the occasional cause suitable as material for non-philosophy. From the perspective of non-philosophy, all philosophical Decisions are equal and open to being used as ‘empirical’ material.


that only philosophy institutes relations. Non-philosophy and the Real itself are Identical in-One in-the-last-instance; or to put it a bit more paradoxically: non-philosophy only has one term—philosophy qua material.

Once we have been given the occasioning instance of philosophical material and given the process of non-philosophical cloning, the question to be asked is who or what carries out this transformation? To whom—if that can even be properly asked—is this non-Decisional thinking occurring to? Here we enter into the subjectivity of non-Philosophy—what Laruelle has called ‘the Stranger’ and Brassier the ‘Alien-subject’. In fact, we have already been grasping towards the non-philosophical subject in our preceding discussion of the force-(of)-thought and the transcendental clone—all of these terms ultimately point towards the non-Decisional subject as that which acts in accordance with Real immanence to determine-in-the-last-instance particular philosophical Decisions.

Following upon these initial reflections, and recalling its foreclosure to the Decisional circle, it should be clear that the non-philosophical subject must—much like Badiou’s subject—be radically non-intuitable, non-phenomenological, non-empirical, non-reflexive and non-conceptual. As with non-philosophy, the ‘non-’ here refers not to a simple negation, but rather a radical foreclosure of the subject to philosophical dyads like intuition/concept, phenomena/phenomenality, materialism/idealism, etc. The subject is simply indifferent to these philosophical characterizations, being always already given prior to any Decisional dyad. As Brassier will claim, the non-philosophical subject is instead ‘simply a function …, an axiomatizing organon, a transcendental computer’.29 Or in other words, the subject is performative: it simply is what it does.30

What is it that the subject does? It carries out the operation involved in unilateral duality. This is the key point—the non-philosophical subject simply is the unilateral duality through which the Real as determining power determines a philosophical Decision as determinable instance, without itself being reciprocally determined by philosophy. This encompasses the basic structure of non-philosophical theory. The act of cloning, therefore, takes the empirico-transcendental hybrid of philosophical Decision and uncovers the non-philosophical subject as the transcendental condition which has (always-already) unilateralized this reciprocal relation by suspending the auto-sufficiency of the philosophical Dyad. From the separate-without-separation between immanence and Decision, we are shifted to the unilateral duality carried out by the non-philosophical subject. In this way, the subject, as the force-(of)-thought, is both the cause and the object of its own knowledge—it determines its own knowledge of itself.31

The subject then, as the act of unilateralizing, requires two distinct causes—a necessary, but necessarily insufficient Real cause (determination-in-the-last-instance) and a sufficient, but necessarily contingent occasional cause (philosophy as contingently given). On the one hand, the former necessarily determines the unilateral duality through which the subject effectuates the Real’s foreclosure to Decision. Yet, in itself it

30. This also entails the counter-intuitive claim, again like Badiou’s own subject, that there is no necessary relation between the subject of non-philosophy and what has typically been labeled subjectivity in philosophy (i.e. self-reflective consciousness as the property solely of humans). As an ontological function, the non-philosophical subject could also be manifested as something utterly inhuman and machinic.
31. ‘This identity of cause and known object is essential, since one of the characteristics that distinguishes materialism from non-philosophy is materialism’s tendency to divide the material cause and the philosophical theory of this cause’. Laruelle, Introduction au non-Marxism, pp. 48-49.
is not sufficient; the Real is indifferent to thought and to philosophy. As a result, non-
philosophy requires the latter cause as the occasional instance from which it can trans-
form philosophical material from self-sufficiency to relative autonomy by effectuating
a thought in accordance with the Real (achieved through the process of cloning). This
latter cause makes the subject always a Stranger for the philosophical ‘world’ whose
Decisional structure it suspends. In this sense, we can draw a loose form of logical
time, wherein (1) we proceed from the Real as always-already-given to (2) the instance
of philosophy as given through its own mode of givenness (its self-sufficiency) to, finally,
(3) non-philosophy as the transformation of philosophy and a cloning of a thought
in accordance with the Real.

Through this transformation, we can clearly see that the non-philosophical sub-
ject must (of necessity if it is to act alongside the Real) be foreclosed to the world as
the realm opened by philosophical Decision. As such, this subject functions as a locus
equally irreducible to its socio-historical context, the constituting power of language,
power, or culture, and any relational system philosophy might generate. It functions,
in other words, as an always-already-given (in-the-last-instance) non-space from which
it becomes possible to suspend and criticize the dominant horizon of phenomena.
‘Consequently, the distinction is not so much between the world and another realm of
practice in-itself, or between the world and a transcendent realm of practice, but be-
tween two ways of relating to the world, one governed by the world, the other deter-
mined-according-to the Real.’ We thus have two conceptions of the subject—on the
one hand, the more traditional subject as that entity (or function or position) occupying
a world, supported by the illusion of philosophy’s self-sufficiency, and determined by
the phenomenological coordinates it sets out. On the other hand, the non-philosophi-
cal subject which is engendered from philosophy as occasional cause and which takes
philosophy as material to be thought in accordance with the Real or as determined-in-
the-last-instance. Thus, we can see why Laruelle will claim that, ‘the problem is how
to use philosophy so as to effect a real transformation of the subject in such a way as to
allow it to break the spell of its bewitchment by the world and enable it to constitute it-
self through a struggle with the latter.’

As we will see in our discussion in the next section, however, the question of the
non-philosophical subject’s intervention in the world must negotiate around the pit-
falls involved in the philosophical elaboration of ‘intervention’. The immediate con-
sequence of the philosophical concept of intervention is that since philosophy is itself
responsible for the determination of what ‘reality’ is, any intervention into that real-
ity will already be circumscribed within the idealist structure of Decision. It takes as
given its own conditions for practice and validates them by measuring all practice
against that philosophically established standard. Philosophical practice, therefore, re-
 mains formally encompassed within its constitutive horizon, even when that horizon
is given as a field of multiplicity or difference that nominally privileges becoming and
transformation. The constitutive horizon of these philosophies of difference neverthe-
less limits practice and limits thought to the phenomenological parameters provided
by the philosophical Decision, while simultaneously prohibiting any transformation of

32. ‘World’ here refers to the space opened by philosophical Decision as that which is philosophizable
(which, from its own perspective is everything).
34. Laruelle, ‘What Can Non-Philosophy Do?’, p. 179.
that horizon itself. Moreover, the very act of intervention, by relying upon the philosophical Decision which makes it intelligible, ultimately reinstates and reproduces the world despite any attempts at intra-worldly transformation. In this specific sense, philosophical intervention can be seen as self-defeating. Contrary to philosophical intervention which aims to intervene in the world, the non-philosophical subject will take the world (i.e. the empirico-transcendental doublet auto-generated by Decision) as its object to transform.

THE CAPITALIST SOCUS

With this discussion of the non-philosophical subject we have seen how it is possible to take up the perspective of the Real radically foreclosed to philosophy. In this way, the self-sufficiency of the philosophical Decision is suspended and made only relatively autonomous with respect to the determination-in-the-last-instance of the Real itself. While the non-philosophical subject provides this possibility, it relies on the empirical given of a philosophical or ideological system with which it can use as material for its cloning. In this regards, it is not simply an abstract movement of thought, but is rather intimately intertwined with the particular philosophical systems providing our contemporary phenomenological coordinates, using them as occasional causes for thinking in accordance with the Real.

Katerina Kolozova has provided an exemplary instance of this in analyzing present-day gender theory from the non-philosophical perspective. Her own ruminations have shown the capacity for individual resistance to the constituting forces of power and knowledge, evoking a unitary subject irreducible to the field of socio-historical constructions. However, while her work is a great addition as a counterweight to the unending discussions of discourse and culture, it is our contention that the most pertinent Decisional field in our present situation is not gender theory.

Our aim here, on the contrary, will be to tackle the currently hegemonic Decision providing the matrix within which nearly every contemporary phenomenon appears. In our own age, there is little doubt that it is capitalism which provides this dominant—and arguably all-encompassing—horizon through which various objects, subjectivities, desires, beliefs and appearances are constituted. Capitalism, in other words, is the philosophical structure presently given to us as material for the non-philosophical subject to operate with.

Before proceeding, however, let us make clear that we are not suggesting that the capitalist Decisional structure was the result of some philosophical act of thought, as though its mere positing in thought were sufficient to bring about its effective reality. Rather, the Decisional structure has been the unintentional product of the numerous and varied social practices which led to capitalism. In good Marxist fashion, we are suggesting that society acted in a manner that constructed its own self-sufficient circle—a manner which only later became replicated in thought. With the rise of commodity production, free labour, and sufficient stores of money, capitalism

36. As Brassier will note, one of the main consequences of the self-sufficiency of Decision is that since each Decision takes itself to be absolute, each is forced to regard alternative Decisions as mutually exclusive. It is a war of philosophy against philosophy (Brassier, ‘Alien Theory’, p. 126).


38. Brassier also speaks of capitalism and non-philosophy in the conclusion of Alien Theory, but despite the undeniable brilliance of the rest of the dissertation and Nihil Unbound, his concluding proposals come across as overly optimistic.
began to unmoor itself from its material grounding and bring about an ontological inversion whereby it progressively recreated the world in the image of the abstract value-form.\textsuperscript{39} Instead of everything being material for philosophy, everything became material for capitalist valorization. We will all too briefly return to these ideas in the conclusion.

With this in mind, it is easy to see that it is Deleuze and Guattari who have provided us with the most explicit model of how capitalism installs itself as a self-sufficient structure—specifically, through their concept of the capitalist socius. In their analysis, capital (as with all the modes of social-production) has the property of appearing as its own cause: ‘It falls back on all production constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed, thereby appropriating for itself all surplus production and arrogating to itself both the whole and the parts of the process, which now seem to emanate from it as a quasi cause.’\textsuperscript{40} This socius (whether capitalist or not) acts as an effect produced by society and its multiplicity of relations and forces of production; yet once produced it functions to unify the disparate social practices into a coherent whole. While achieving this unification through the regulation of social relations in accordance with its image of the whole, the socius simultaneously comes to organize the productive and cooperative practices it originally emerged from. For example, capital deterritorializes archaic social formations in order to reterritorialize the released material flows in a temporary, but exploitative relation—conjoining heterogeneous flows of labour and capital in order to convert them into quantities from which surplus-value can be extracted. Furthermore, capital becomes an all-encompassing productive force in that it ends up producing even subjectivity itself—hence the mobile, flexible worker of contemporary neoliberalism is a product of the deterritorialization carried out by capital,\textsuperscript{41} being produced as a residue of the process (a similar process occurs with the consumer). In a very real sense, therefore, the socius both causes the mode of production\textsuperscript{42} to emerge and is produced as an effect of it. This is a paradoxical claim, and one worth looking at again in more detail in order to clearly understand the logic. On one hand, it is clear that there is a historical process involved in producing the particular mode of production—i.e. the socius is an effect of the inventive and constituent power of the multitude; it is produced by their labour power, prior to any appropriation by capital. But on the other hand, with the emergence of capitalism, capital itself begins to quasi cause production by coercing it and employing constituent power within its functioning. What occurs then, is a sort of asymptotical approach towards the particular mode of production on the level of the historical processes; and then—in a moment of auto-positioning—the socius itself emerges simultaneously as both cause and effect, as both presupposing its empirical reality (through the productive power of the multitude) and positing its a priori horizon (the full body of capital), while positing as presupposed their syn-


\textsuperscript{41} Even in its briefly liberating phase, the flexible subject was a reaction against (and hence relied upon) the Fordist mode of production. See: Paolo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude*, Los Angeles, Semiotext(e), 2004, pp. 98-9.

\textsuperscript{42} Following Jason Read, we will use ‘modes of production’ in an expanded sense to include the production of subjectivity, desires, beliefs, along with the more common material basis. See: Jason Read, *The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2003.
thesis in a transcendental unity (the Body without Organs, or BwO, as the absolute condition, or the plane of absolutely deterritorialized flows). While counterintuitive, this claim should nevertheless be familiar from our reading of the structure of philosophical Decision. As a ubiquitous structure, we should not be surprised to discern it operating in a variety of fields. Thus we can clearly see that the ‘philosophical’ Decision is as much a ‘political’ Decision as an ‘economic’ Decision.43 In this regards, Steven Shaviro has recently provided a particularly illuminating description of this capitalist Decisional structure:

The socius, or ‘full body of capital’, is entirely composed of material processes in the phenomenal world; and yet, as the limit and the summation of all these processes, it has a quasi-transcendental status. That is to say, the body of capital is not a particular phenomenon that we encounter at a specific time and place; it is rather the already-given presupposition of whatever phenomenon we do encounter. We cannot experience this capital-body directly, and for itself; yet all our experiences are lodged within it, and can properly be regarded as its effects. The monstrous flesh of capital is the horizon, or the matrix, or the underlying location and container of our experience, as producers or as consumers. In this sense, it can indeed be regarded as something like what Kant would call a transcendental condition of experience. Or better—since it is a process, rather than a structure or an entity—it can be understood as what Deleuze and Guattari call a basic ‘synthesis’ that generates and organizes our experience.44

It is this complex structure—which includes the ‘material processes in the phenomenal world’, the ‘capital-body’ as the socius organizing the practices, and the BwO as the immanent synthesis of these two terms—which we will subject to the non-Decisional method.

By making the self-sufficiency of capitalism explicit, we are in a position that allows us to begin to explain a number of important contemporary phenomena—most notably, the real subsumption carried out by capitalism. With this notion, it has been declared that capitalism constitutively has no outside—all of society, including everyday innocuous socializing processes, becomes productive for capital as it shifts to immaterial labour. As such, resistance cannot place itself in an external relation to capitalism, and tends to instead work solely with immanent tendencies—tendencies that are unfortunately all too easily reincorporated within capitalism. However, the recognition of capitalism as an instance of the auto-positing structure of Decision already gives us a non-philosophical—or rather, a non-capitalist—perspective on this situation. We can see that the reason for our present inability to escape the world of capitalist Decision is because it constitutes the Real in its own inescapable terms. In the same way that philosophy makes everything material for philosophy, so too does capitalism make everything material for productive valorization. Moreover, as our earlier discussion of philosophical intervention pointed out, practice based within the world opened by a Decision is necessarily incapable of affecting the horizon of that world; at best, it can reconfigure aspects given in the world without being able to transform the mode of givenness of the world. So political action based within the world will inevitably fail at revolution (as the radical transformation from one Decision to another). What is re-

43. Or more specifically, Decision is not intrinsically philosophical at all—just as Brassier argues that philosophy is not intrinsically Decisional. Rather, Decision constitutes an important mechanism which subsumes everything within its purview; one which is operative in a variety of domains.

quired is a transformation of this capitalist structure and a concomitant transformation of the corresponding subject.\textsuperscript{45}

In this project, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's work—despite its flaws—is indispensable. Heavily borrowing from Deleuze and Guattari, Negri and Hardt have re-fashioned the ‘productive forces/capitalist socius’ dyad in terms of the ‘multitude/capital’ and the ‘constituent/constituted power’ dyads. In their works, the multitude is a political body both produced from common cooperation and productive of the common, as the residual product of the multitude's cooperation. So, for example, everyday interactions involving social and affective knowledge are both the source of cooperation and the production of community. The problem is that with the hegemony\textsuperscript{46} of immaterial labour (e.g. service and knowledge-based industries), capitalism has taken these immediately creative and productive capacities of the multitude and integrated them within its operations. The reliance of the capitalist socius on the social and affective knowledge of the multitude, moreover, is reciprocated by capital's production of subjectivity. Capital and surplus-value are, in other words, produced by the labour of the multitude, yet at the same time responsible for inciting, incorporating, organizing and creating the multitude (even its ‘free time’)—effectively establishing a self-sufficient circle.

To suspend capitalism's pretension at self-sufficiency, we will therefore initially take the capitalist dyad of multitude/capital or constituent/constitutive power and separate the real term—multitude—from its reliance on the opposing term.\textsuperscript{47} We must now suspend any philosophical or capitalist constitution of the multitude and instead take it as an axiom determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real itself. Thus, whereas Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt will submit the multitude to a dyadic relation with capital, and philosophically determine the nature of real immanence, non-philosophy forecloses this possibility by positing the multitude as always already given-without-givenness—prior to any enmeshment in Marxist discourse or systems of social relations. The non-philosophical multitude\textsuperscript{48} is cloned as the transcendental conditions foreclosed to the operations of the capitalist socius. Which is also to say that the multitude performs the Real, acts in accordance with it, prior to any incorporation within the capitalist or philosophical Decision. Moreover, it is this non-capitalist multitude

\textsuperscript{45} 'It [i.e. non-philosophy] transforms the subject by transforming instances of philosophy.' François Laruelle, 'A New Presentation of Non-Philosophy' <http://www.onphi.net/texte-a-new-presentation-of-non-philosophy-32.html> [accessed 15 July 2008].

\textsuperscript{46} To be clear, hegemony does not mean quantitative majority—rather the hegemony of immaterial labour points to the way in which it shifts all forms of labour according to its precepts. For example, even industrial labour has begun to incorporate and rely upon immaterial labour in its production process.

\textsuperscript{47} Multitude is clearly the real term of the dyad because Negri and Hardt assert that a constituent power has no need for constituted power—i.e. it is ontologically sufficient in-itself, with capital being merely a secondary parasitic body. The problem, as with all Decisions, is that despite its materialist pretensions, the very form of philosophizing involved surreptitiously makes the immanence of the multitude dependent upon the constituted powers it struggles against. In a very real way, this Decisional enmeshing of the two reveals why Negri and Hardt come across as overly optimistic in their claims that the multitude can surpass and extricate itself from capital—as though the real world made clear their Decisional synthesis, despite Negri and Hardt's claims to the contrary.

\textsuperscript{48} An important caveat: the non-capitalist multitude, as foreclosed to capitalist determination, must necessarily be left unqualified by determining predicates like ‘class’ and ‘proletariat’. ‘Multitude’ is instead an axiomatic here; a name of the Real posited by the Real itself as always-already foreclosed to capitalism. We can’t, in other words, say ‘what’ this multitude is—merely that it is and that it is determining-in-the-last-instance. The difficulty, as we will cover in the conclusion, is how to incorporate this instance of the already-determined-without-determination into politics.
which effectively acts as the Identity (without-unity) underlying its various, heterogeneous worldly appearances. Kolozova’s work points the way towards this, by re-conceiving Identity in non-philosophical terms as that invariant \( \mathbb{X} \) irreducible to any sort of linguistic, conceptual, or relational determination.\(^49\) In her work these socio-historical determinations are carried out by structures of power and language, as explicated by constructivist gender theory. The (non-)multitude, on the other hand, takes capitalism as the determining world which it remains irreducible or foreclosed to. In either case, however, the Real invariant always already retains the potential to resist and refuse the determinations imposed upon it. Unlike the singularities constitutive of Negri and Hardt’s multitude, the non-capitalist subject, the force-(of)-thought specific to capitalism, is determined-in-the-last-instance by a Real radically indifferent to its capitalist enmeshment. Instead of Negri and Hardt’s singularity, Laruelle will speak of a radical solitude proper to the non-philosophical subject, to mark its irreducibility to any worldly determination, even class, gender, race and ethnicity.\(^50\) It is the implicitly presupposed, yet non-posted immanence of capitalism.

Therefore, what the non-philosophical take has to offer over and above the philosophical conception of the multitude is an always already given locus of resistance to any form of control by capitalism. As Shaviro has pointed out,\(^51\) what is ultimately naively utopian about Negri and Hardt’s concept of the multitude is its valorization of the multitude’s creativity without the simultaneous recognition that it is capitalism that incites, organizes and appropriates this creativity. Despite Negri and Hardt’s optimism, their conception of the multitude therefore remains irreducibly intertwined with capital. In these regards, the multitude offers no exit from capitalism, but is instead simply a creative power for capitalism’s self-perpetuation.\(^52\) Non-philosophy, on the other hand, separates (in the non-philosophical sense) the multitude as Real force-(of)-thought from its immersion in the capitalist world. It indexes a territory incapable of being colonized by capital’s imperialist ambitions—one where capitalism’s tendency to reduce all of being to commodities and tools for capitalism is always already suspended and where the Real itself determines the nature of the capitalist world. In doing so, both thought and practice remove the limits imposed upon them by capitalism, framed as they were by the horizon of the capital-body. New options, unimaginable for capitalism, become available to thought and practice. The new options cannot be intentionally accessed, of course, but the non-philosophical subject (the multitude, in our non-capitalism) becomes capable of acting in accordance with the Real in such a way that is not bound by the strictures of phenomenological legitimation, thereby opening the space for an event incommensurable with the dominant Decision.\(^53\)

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50. We can see Negri and Hardt’s reintroduction of singularity into the world through their description of the multitude as a class concept, even if it is distinguished from traditional class concepts. See: Antonio Negri, ‘Towards an Ontological Definition of Multitude’ trans. Arriana Bove <http://multitudes.samizdat.net/spip.php?article269> [accessed 15 July 2008].


52. This also has parallels to Žižek’s critique of Deleuze and Guattari as the archetypal philosophers of capitalism—espousing endless creativity, and novel products and modes of jouissance that are all perfectly compatible with capitalism.

53. Despite some overt similarities, this idea of deregulating philosophical limits goes beyond even the absolute deterritorialization espoused by Deleuze and Guattari. Whereas the latter remains a hybrid synthetic unity of the terms it separates, the ‘beyond’ of non-philosophy is foreclosed to any such dyad. In this
Yet, what are we left with after all this theoretical elaboration? We have tried to show that non-philosophy opens a space beyond any philosophical or capitalist Decision, thereby offering an always-already-given locus of resistance. This space also makes possible the advent of a radically new determination (from the perspective of the world). But we have no way in which to effectively use this space for resisting capitalism. The use of this space requires a project to work towards, which in turn appears to necessarily entail some philosophical world provided by a Decision. In some ways, we have reached the limit of Laruelle’s non-philosophy—at least in terms of developing a political project based on it. As Brassier will say, ‘there can be no ‘ethics of radical immanence’ and consequently no ethics of non-philosophy. The very notion of an ‘ethics of immanence’ is another instance of the way in which philosophical decision invariably subordinates immanence to a transcendental teleological horizon’. Non-philosophy thus appears as a significant and important rejoinder to philosophical (or political, as we saw) pretensions, limiting philosophy in much the same way that Kant limited metaphysics. But beyond this it can make no positive pronouncements in itself. This is perhaps unsurprising, since as we mentioned earlier, non-philosophy is largely an explanatory framework, seeking to heteronomously explain philosophy’s relative autonomy, or in this case, capitalism’s purported self-sufficiency.

**CONCLUSION**

In our conclusion, we will try and move beyond this dead-end by turning towards some more speculative propositions concerning how non-philosophy must change our conceptions of politics. Brassier hints at these options when he criticizes Laruelle’s universal claims about Decisions (i.e. that all philosophy is constituted by a Decisional structure). Rather than reducing philosophy to a simple invariant and content-less structure, non-philosophy must realize its claims about Decision are localizable within only a portion of philosophy’s history. With this de-universalization of Laruelle’s claims, the door is now open for methods of non-philosophy other than the ones Laruelle outlines. A careful thinker could both escape the Decisional structure of auto-positing and escape the limited methods used by Laruelle (such as cloning). These new methods, therefore, can be used to develop philosophical themes in a non-philosophical manner alongside the Real. Meillassoux’s project seems to us to be an example of this possibility, operating not through some delineation of transcendental and empirical structures, but rather through an argument aimed at undermining the limits of a typical philosophical position (correlationism). With a specific focus on the political aspects we are concerned with here, it can be seen that a non-Decisional form of philosophy need not be reduced to the solely negative restrictions placed on politics by Laruelle’s own version of non-Decisional philosophy. Instead, a more fully developed (non-)politics could be constructed that recognizes the political potential of the transcendental locus of resistance offered by non-philosophy, while also integrating it into the capitalist world through a productive political subject and project.

way it remains radically immanent and radically foreclosed to any decisional determination or limitation. For more on Deleuze and Guattari’s plane of immanence as a hybrid, see: Brassier, ‘Alien Theory’, p. 54-84.

56. Laruelle himself admits this possibility when he claims ‘non-philosophy [may] not yet represent the most widely agreed upon mutation of foundation … others are still obviously possible and will be, in any event, sought by generations which will not, like ours, let themselves be enclosed in their history’ Laruelle, ‘A New Presentation of Non-Philosophy’, emphasis added.
Before embarking on this project, though, it is important to clarify that a realist system such as the present one offers no positive vision for politics. As the previous sections have hopefully made clear, the non-philosophical Real is neither conceptualizable nor recoverable within a political system of thought. As we aim to show in the conclusion here, what non-philosophy can instead offer to politics is the immanent space to suspend the pretensions of any totalizing system, as well as an elaboration of how non-philosophical revolution might appear within the world. It cannot, however, offer any positive prescriptions for action, or values for motivation, or grounds for certainties. As radically indifferent to any conceptual system, the Real provides no comfort to political or ethical ventures.

Despite the non-prescriptive nature of non-philosophy, it is still possible to undertake an analysis of the appearance within the world of a new Decisional space, i.e. a new world. This line of thought stems from two pieces of evidence. The first is our earlier claim that capitalism was the result of a historical process that emerged from the concerted effort of innumerable workers and individuals interacting with their natural environment. Historically, it is clear that capitalism, despite being a self-sufficient structure, had relations in some sense with the pre-capitalist world. This suggests the possibility of constructing new Decisions within the given world. But this claim must rest upon our second piece of evidence: Laruelle’s argument for the ‘non-sufficiency’ of the Real. In his words,

the One … in no way produces philosophy or the World …—there is no real genesis of philosophy. This is the non-sufficiency of the One as necessary but non-sufficient condition. … A givenness of philosophy is thus additionally necessary if the vision-in-One is to give philosophy according to its own mode of being-given. … The vision-in-One gives philosophy if a philosophy presents itself. But philosophy gives itself according to the mode of its own self-positing/givenness/reflection/naming, or according to that of a widened self-consciousness or universal cogito.57

The Real itself does not give philosophy (or rather, Decision), but must instead rely upon the contingent occasion of a philosophy giving itself ‘according to the mode of its own self-positing/givenness/reflection/naming’. The reason for this is because the unilateral relation permits only philosophy to distinguish itself from immanence. The Real itself does not distinguish itself from philosophy, remaining indifferent to its transcendence, and so the occasioning cause necessary for non-philosophical thought (i.e. philosophy as material) requires that philosophy give itself according to its own mode of givenness. Without the latter operation, there would never be any transcendence from which non-philosophy could operate. The question that is immediately raised here is where does this givenness of philosophy come from? A purely ex nihilo incarnation would seem to suggest a space irreducible to both immanence and philosophy—something which would seem a priori impossible in a system premised on determination-in-the-last-instance by the Real. The more plausible answer is that the givenness of novel philosophical Decisions is produced in a non-reductive manner through the material of previous philosophical worlds. Using our example of capitalism, the shift from a pre-capitalist formation to a properly capitalist formation can be seen as an unintentional and contingent result of the shifting relations between forces and relations of production (including the subjectivities produced). Which means that while the Real may be the determination-in-the-last-instance, the phenomenological world

within which we qua individuals operate appears to in some sense overdetermine the Real. As mentioned previously, unlike Althusser, the overdetermination here would not be determined-in-the-last-instance by some fundamental contradiction, but instead by the radically foreclosed Real. Moreover, overdetermination would also remain foreclosed to determining the Real, instead sufficing to determine the contingent progression of philosophical Decisions through intra-worldly transformations. Such a proposition would remain within the ambit of non-philosophy by refusing to establish a philosophical dyad, instead merely taking non-philosophy’s requirement for material at its word—even the novel worldly formations determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real require some material to be always-already given.

Most importantly, this notion of intra-worldly transformation simultaneously proposes the distinct possibility of a collective subject operating within the Decisional space. Acting in accordance with the Real, such a collective group would entail both an identity-in-the-last-instance with the Real (by virtue of being determined by it) and a duality-without-synthesis effectuated by the unilateral relation carried out from philosophy’s reflective perspective. Such a subject would of necessity be foreclosed to any definite identifying predicates such as class, race, gender, or even minority status. The corollary to this requirement would be the counter-intuitive claim that any sociological group could have the possibility to act in accordance with radical immanence, simply by taking up this simultaneous identity and duality involved there. In relation to our earlier discussion of the non-philosophical subject, this intra-worldly subject would act as the phenomenal manifestation of that non-philosophical subject. We must be careful here, however—this ‘manifestation’ would be an event, but a non-philosophical form of event that occurs without regard for any philosophical conception of the event, hindered as they are by a Decision which makes their concept the result of reducing temporal continuities in the name of the philosophical ‘real’ shining through.

In contrast to the intra-worldly events which occupy philosophy’s attention, this non-philosophical event is properly an Advent of the philosophical world itself. The collective subject would be the manifestation of a new world acting in accordance with a Real indifferent to the limitations of the present world. In what way then, does this Advent manifest itself phenomenally? It is worth quoting in full Laruelle’s description:

“The Advent, we now know, does not lie at the world’s horizon and is not the other side of that horizon (Heidegger). But neither can it be said to constitute an infinite of reverse verticality, of reverse transcendence which would pierce or puncture the horizon (Levinas). The Advent comes neither from afar nor from on high. It emerges as a radical solitude that it is impossible to manipulate, to dominate, to reduce, like the solitude of the great works of art .... It no longer announces anything, it is neither absence nor presence.

59. To be clear, it is an identity, by virtue of being identical with radical immanence (which does not distingush itself from anything), and a duality by virtue of effectuating a unilateral duality from the internal perspective of philosophy.
60. Although this claim should be less counter-intuitive when it is recalled that Marx saw in the bourgeoisie a revolutionary group, relative to its feudal origins. A revolutionary group need not be a progressive group, nor must it remain revolutionary.
nor even an ‘other presence’, but rather unique solitude given-in-One in-the-last-instance. It emerges as the identity of a unique face without a ‘face to face’."\(^{63}\)

It is in this manner that the Advent presents itself, with a portion being given in solitude (its immanent cause as determination-in-the-last-instance) and another portion relative to the world (from which it draws its material and occasional cause for its ‘unique face’).\(^{64}\) In this way it can both escape any determining constraints imposed upon the Real by the world, and use the world as a sufficient but non-necessary source of material. In other words, while we are always already determined in accordance with the Real, we are only phenomenalized as potential political actors in the world, through the material provided by our contemporary Decisional structures. The intra-worldly subject, therefore, is merely the phenomenal face of the non-philosophical subject—the radical locus of resistance clothed in an arbitrary, yet non-determining, philosophical material. It is with this material clothing that we can function to effect transformations—not in, but of—the phenomenological world we inhabit.

Returning to our example of the pre-capitalist situation, we can perceive in its historical advent, the slow but persistent accumulation of philosophical material that eventually functioned as the occasional cause for a non-philosophical Advent. While the potential for determination-in-the-last-instance to be effectuated in non-philosophical thought is always already there, it is perhaps only in certain worldly moments that the self-sufficiency constitutive of the world becomes less than certain, thereby opening the space for the Advent of a non-philosophical subject capable of radically transforming the very horizon of Being.

What still remains to be thought, however, is the manner in which the solitude of the Advent can be transformed, or perhaps simply extended, into the type of full-fledged world in which we are normally given. What is required, in other words, is some functional equivalent to Badiou’s concept of forcing, whereby the event is investigated and its findings integrated into a new situation.\(^{65}\) With that project incomplete, the suspension of Decision and the advent of a non-philosophical subject can only constitute the necessary, but not yet sufficient, conditions for constructing new empirico-transcendental spaces incommensurable with the capitalist socius.

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64. We earlier referred to this structure as its simultaneous identity (without-unity) and duality (without-synthesis).